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The Center for Defense Management Reform prepared this report in response to several areas of 
inquiry raised by the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) including the process of presidential 
transitions, the government business reform trajectory, and DoD and presidential candidate 
perspectives on business transformation/BTA. We drew from academic publications, public 
documents, published candidate perspectives, and interviews with 30 key DoD personnel in our 
research. The benefits of this study include a solid review of presidential transitions, a view of the 
projected areas of future reform, insights into the positions of the candidates, and perspectives on 
business transformation and BTA from those most likely to be targeted by the transition team of 
the next administration. The limitations of the study are that the reform focus and candidate 
perspectives will change and evolve, and the findings cannot be generalized to all of DoD. The 
report covers three main sections: the presidential transition process, the reform trajectory, and 
DoD/candidates’ perspectives on business transformation. The report concludes with a summary of 
recommendations.  
Summary of findings  
To help us better understand the environment that BTA will operate in during the next few 
years, we targeted three areas for examination:  
1. The presidential transition process 
2. The government business reform trajectory 
3. DoD and candidate perspectives on business transformation/BTA 
 
Each area provides insights to how BTA can best position themselves in the months ahead. 
The presidential transition process  
Presidential transitions are complex events with intermingling elements of politics, policy 
setting, and public administration. They occur in three distinct phases starting with the campaign, 
then the interregnum between the election and inauguration, and ending in the first several months 
of the new administration. In each of these phases, there are key things to watch out for: 
 Campaigning is not the same as governing 
 Activity will spike in the last 100 days of the sitting presidency 
 Administrative tasks will increase 
 Transition books and briefs need to be developed 
 Organizational and personnel changes increase 
 A leadership vacuum will emerge 
 Political appointees, agendas, and policies will change  
 
Because of all these changes, career executives become the lynchpin between politics and 
administration.  During transitions, we recommend that career executives know when to engage 
(and when not to), and to recognize that the new team may not realize right away that they need 
you. To be successful, maintain clear lines of authority and communication, exploit opportunities, 
and manage risks. 
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The government business reform trajectory 
Our next area of focus looks at the trends in management reform from three perspectives: 
past Secretaries of Defense, the GAO, and educators and pundits.  Based on an analysis of these 
sources, we identified three functional areas that candidates are likely to focus on for reform:  
 Contracting and Acquisitions 
 Human Resources 
 Readiness 
 
In addition, there are three types of outcomes that candidates will most likely target for reform: 
 Program effectiveness 
 Transparency 
 Business process improvements  
 
Each candidate has a different level of emphasis related to these areas, which we cover in the 
body of the report.  
OSD and candidate perspectives on business transformation 
To understand how business transformation and BTA may transition to the next 
administration, we targeted some of those in DoD who would be likely to have the ear of the 
candidates or their transition team. The areas of concern for BTA that emerged from the data 
included the following: 
1. What is expected from business transformation? 
2. What specific outcomes are valued? 
3. What are the barriers and tensions to achieving business transformation? 
4. What are the strengths of BTA? 
5. What are the weaknesses of BTA? 
 
What is business transformation?  
First of all, many people within the DoD believe that business transformation should focus on 
delivering fundamental change and process improvements.  This emphasis was in stark contrast to 
a focus on systems, which was seen as a secondary aspect.   The candidates, at this point in time, are 
less specific about business transformation and its goals, but both are running on a change 




DoD participants surfaced five key outcomes critical to successful business transformation.  The 
outcomes included operational, financial, strategic, personal, and ideological benefits:  
 Improved efficiency  
 Improved effectiveness  
 Transparency  
 Decision-making support 
 Ease of use 
 
These desired outcomes should be used as communication touch points for BTA to articulate its 
value. 
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Barriers and Tensions 
DoD participants, in general, recognize the complexity of the DoD and the difficulty of managing 
change.  The barriers that our participants identified include many issues common in a large 
bureaucracy: 
 Change is difficult 
 The workforce is unprepared for change 
 Turf protection is rampant 
 Leadership frequently changes 
 Many may have unrealistic expectations 
 
In addition to these specific barriers, there are several areas where DoD may expect BTA to 
operate in contradictory ways; these issues call for a both/and instead of  an either/or approach: 
 Centralized vs. decentralized power   
 Strategic vs. tactical approach 
 Insider vs. outsider perspectives 
 
The barriers and tensions that we identified are widely recognized as common in large scale 
change efforts. As such, BTA can acknowledge them, distinguish BTA activities as moves toward 




When discussing BTA in particular, DoD participants identified several areas where BTA is 
strong: 
 BTA is needed as a cross-functional and impartial agency 
 BTA has enterprise experience  
 BTA is necessary in setting and maintaining standards 
 BTA can help in the global war on terror 
 
These areas of strength can be used as key arguments in favor of BTA and to counter or mitigate 
some of the criticisms of BTA. 
 
Criticisms of BTA 
Finally, while most participants saw value in BTA, there were several areas where the 
participants identified possibilities for improvement.  The criticisms include organizational as well 
interpersonal factors: 
 BTA is too large and inefficient 
 BTA lacks change management skills 
 BTA is not always collaborative 
 BTA shouldn’t take ownership of core business outcomes 
 BTA is too system focused 
 BTA is poor at selling themselves 
 The BEA is not as effective as it could be 
 
These criticisms can be addressed by considering organizational changes and/or by improving 
communication strategies. 
   Introduction 
©2008    Center for Defense Management Reform  7 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
The research and recommendations presented in this report are a response to several areas of 
inquiry raised by the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) about transitioning business 
transformation to the next presidential administration. To address the needs of the BTA, we 
focused on four specific purposes:  
1. To review the process of presidential transitions and provide guidance for managing that 
process.  
2. To provide a broad overview of current trends in DoD management reform 
3. To assess the value proposition of business transformation generally and BTA specifically as 
perceived by key members of OSD, the military services, and Combatant Commanders 
4. To analyze and project each presidential candidate’s perspectives (Barak Obama and John 
McCain) regarding business transformation.  
Methods 
 There were two primary methods we used in this research project. The first method, which 
targeted the nature of presidential transitions, current reform trends, and the candidates’ 
perspectives on reform, relied on a variety of publicly available materials including academic 
research, government reports, popular press publications, political expert and pundit commentary, 
and other related public materials.  
The second method, which we used to assess the value proposition of business 
transformation and BTA, relied on interviews; specifically, we interviewed 30 participants drawn 
from OSD1 (PSAs, PA&E, FM, DFAS, BTA, DLA, JCIDs), the military services (Army, Navy, Air Force), 
and Combatant Commanders (AFRICOM, EUCOM, Marine Expeditionary Force). We conducted 
qualitative, semi-structured interviews that lasted approximately one hour. Twenty five of the 
interviews were conducted in person, and 5 took place either by VTC or telephone. For most 
interviews, two researchers attended; the first primarily ran the interview and asked questions, the 
second took notes on interviewee responses. Following each interview, the researchers 
immediately went over the notes to coordinate their perceptions and clarify any disparities. When 
necessary, the researchers followed up with participants for further clarification. To analyze the 
responses, the researchers carefully reviewed the results to uncover themes in responses. Those 
themes were entered into a spreadsheet, assessed again several times by each researcher, and were 
ultimately refined to the categories of findings that appear in this report.   
Benefits of the study 
 There are several benefits to this study and how it was conducted. First, the review of 
academic literature and public data provided a general overview of the government management 
reform. This overview was derived from a variety of sources and provides a solid background for 
understanding the reform trajectory moving into the new administration. Second, the analysis of 
candidate perspectives resulted in a profile of each candidate relative to business transformation, 
which will likely be useful following the election (for summary candidate sketches, see Appendix A). 
Finally, the analysis of transitions in general provides specific recommendations for managing 
different phases within the process.  
                                                             
1 For the sake of simplicity, we characterize OSD more broadly than is actually accurate. Primarily, we sought 
to differentiate the military services and COCOMs from those closer to OSD.  
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 There are also several benefits to our assessment of the value proposition of business 
transformation and BTA. First, the interviews provided a sampling of perspectives related to 
business transformation efforts. Specifically, the nature of the interview method elicited those 
perspectives that came immediately to mind regarding effective business transformation efforts and 
BTAs contribution to those efforts. Second, the participants we interviewed included many 
personnel who would likely be among those targeted by the transition team; in other words, they 
were not only key consumers of business transformation efforts, many may be consulted through 
the transition about the value of business transformation to date. Third, the results of this research 
can serve as a pilot study for future research that targets specific areas that emerged. As a broader, 
perceptual study, we allowed for all perspectives to surface in our analysis. Based on these findings, 
BTA can assess areas of priority for further research, organizational changes, and communication 
strategies.  
Limitations of the study 
 There are limitations to this study. First, while the early analysis of the candidates’ 
perspectives is valuable, it is based on, and therefore limited by, the rhetoric of the campaign. 
Consequently, the views of the candidates will almost certainly evolve and change over time. 
Second, while we see much value in the perceptual map of those who have experience with BTA and 
business transformation efforts, the nature of our investigation does not allow for generalizing the 
findings. Follow-on studies, such as surveys and other structured assessments, would need to target 
more specific questions in order to support generalizations. Third, our sample of participants was 
broad rather than deep. So, for example, while we talked with PSAs who have experience with BTA 
at higher levels, we did not interview staff within their functional areas. Finally, we did not do an 
assessment of BTAs current activities and initiatives. However, regarding this final limitation, it is 
important to recognize that regardless of current BTA activities, the perspectives of participants are 
reflective of the perception of value and, as such, an important area of focus. 
 Structure of report 
 We have structured this report in five sections. Section 1 contains the summary of findings. 
Section 2 reviews the process of presidential transitions from the perspective of the federal career 
executive, including specific recommendations for managing the transition. Section 3 covers the 
reform trajectory, which concentrates on trends in government management reform. Section 4 
covers the both DoD participants’ and the candidates’ perspectives on effective business 
transformation in general, including goals, specific outcomes, barriers, and tensions. Additionally, 
Section 4 includes DoD participants’ perspectives of the strengths and criticisms of BTAs role in 
DoD business transformation efforts. Finally, Section 5 offers our recommendations for BTA based 
on the findings of this report.  
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Section 2: The Process of Presidential Transitions 
Presidential transitions are complex events with intermingling elements of politics, policy 
setting, and public administration. They occur in three distinct phases starting with the campaign, 
then the interregnum between the election and inauguration, and ending in the first several months 
of the new administration. There are three sets of actors directly involved in the process:  
1. Outgoing administration,  
2. Incoming administration, and  
3. Career executives who serve under both.   
 
Books have been written on the subject of presidential transitions,2 and it is both outside the scope 
and not the intent of this document to cover the ground of those texts. Additionally, while useful, 
much of the existing work done about presidential transitions primarily address the perspective of 
the White House, not the perspective of federal agencies.3  
In this report, we take the point of view of the career executive—that is, both the senior 
executives (SES) and the uniformed military (flag level officers)—and we focus on the issues that 
the career executives are likely to confront. First, we provide a brief overview of presidential 
transitions. Next, we address eight key issues that are likely to affect federal agencies; specifically, 
the transition from campaigning to governing, the outgoing administration’s “Last 100 Days” 
agenda, the administrative aspects of transition, transition books and briefs, change management, 
the leadership vacuum, the arrival of the new team, and changes to the policy agenda. Within our 
discussion of each of those issues, we provide a description of what to expect and recommendations 
for how to respond.   
Overview 
There has not been an open presidential election since 1952. By “open” we mean that 
neither the sitting president nor the sitting vice-president is running for president, leaving no heir-
apparent. We can be sure that, whatever the outcome in November, some non-trivial amount of 
change will occur after the election. The incoming team will need to be prepared to initiate that 
change. Federal departments and agencies need to be prepared to accept it and implement it. It is a 
unique process in America: the periodic and peaceful exchange of one government for another and 
the metamorphosis of candidates to presidents. There are three points of view (incoming 
administration, outgoing administration, and career executives) across the three time frames (pre-
election, interregnum, post election), from which to view a presidential transition (see Table 1). 
 
                                                             
2 Two excellent examples include: James P. Pfiffner, The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running, 2nd 
ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996) and Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan, The White 
House World: Transitions, Organization, and Office Operations. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University 
Press, 2003). 
3 Notable exceptions include a few worthwhile papers about the agency’s experience with transition: Clay 
Johnson, “The 2000-01 Presidential Transition: Planning, Goals and Reality,” PS: Political Science and Politics, 
35 (2002): 51-53; Michael S. Hamilton, “The Career Service and Presidential Transition: From Bush to Clinton 
to National Performance Review,” Public Administration Quarterly, 20 (1996): 52-70; Hal G. Rainey and 
Barton Wechsler “Executive-Level Transition: Toward a Conceptual Framework,” Public Productivity Review, 
12 (1988): 45-60; and Gregory H. Gaertner, Karen N. Gaertner and Irene Devine, “Federal Agencies in the 
Context of Transition: A Contrast between Democratic and Organizational Theories,” Public Administration 
Review, 43 (1983): 421-432.  
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• Implement last 100 days agenda 
• Wrap up affairs
• Share lessons with next 
administration
• Consider transition effects 
of actions
• Plan for transition 
administrative activities
• Prepare organization for 
change
• Complete policy agenda
• Build a transition budget
• Promulgate direction to 
agencies regarding 
transition activities
Pre-Election                      Interregnum                         Post-Election
• Implement Presidential Transition 
Act provisions
• Build briefing books
• Meet with transition team; 
provide information
• Manage organizational change 
dynamics
• Prepare to assume temporary 
leadership role
• Assume leadership role 
pending new appointments
• Orient and advise the new 
team
• Complete the budget
• Implement new policy agenda
• Manage organizational change
• Campaign
• Establish Transition Team
• Analyze issues, formulate 
policies
• Consider policy 
implementation strategies
• Establish prospective 
White House team
• Establish DC presence
• Learn political processes
• Build relationships with Congress
• Select and vet key personnel
• Design White House operations
• Enter agencies and departments
• Refine policies & implementation 
strategies; set the agenda
• Learn bureaucratic processes
• Establish a functioning White 
House
• Place political appointees
• Implement agenda
• Adjust the budget
• Continue to learn about and 




































The incoming administration begins transition activities well before the campaign ends by 
establishing a transition organization. That organization takes responsibility for transitioning the 
candidate from a focus on winning a campaign to a focus on governing and implanting a new 
agenda. The incoming transition organization focuses on policy positions, policy implementation 
strategies, and identifying key personnel to lead that implementation. Later, the incoming transition 
team concentrates on learning the political and bureaucratic processes that are necessary for 
successful policy implementation. They establish an efficient White House organization, and begin 
the work of placing personnel within the executive agencies. 
Outgoing administration 
The outgoing administration focuses on completing the highest priority portions of its 
policy agenda. They are interested in ensuring their legacy, and they will attempt to do that through 
bureaucratic momentum and unilateral actions. Administratively, they will prepare a transition 
budget to hand to the new administration, and they will mobilize the provisions of the Presidential 
Transition Acts. The outgoing administration will prepare to brief the new administration and 
ensure a seamless transfer of authority. 
   The Process of Presidential Transitions 
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Career executives 
The career executives focus upward to the new administration and the political change. 
They will implement the final stages of the outgoing team’s agenda, prepare for the administrative 
portions of the transition event, work with the new team to orient them to the functions of and 
issues in their agency, and eventually assist in the implementation of the new agenda. 
Simultaneously, they focus downward as they manage the organizational dynamics that result 
when significant change affects the environment of an organization.   
We now turn to the specific issues that career executives will face throughout the transition 
process.  
Issue:  Campaigning is not the same as governing    
What to look for  
Campaigning and governing differ. Effective campaigning before the election accentuates 
the differences between candidates, between parties, and between policy agendas. Campaigning 
focuses on the short-term, is highly competitive, and has a discrete outcome. On the other hand, 
effective governing involves consensus building, coalition forming, and cooperation. In governing, 
compromise, not competition, is essential. Decisions have infinite possible outcomes, and the focus 
is more long-term. These attributes necessarily involve different sets of skills and demand different 
advice and counsel and staff support. In effective transitions, the incoming administration 
recognizes this difference and deliberately manages the conversion.     
What to do about it   
Listen to the campaign rhetoric with a grain of salt. Look at those who advise the candidates 
and think about the advisors’ leadership styles. Several of those advisors will likely be part of the 
administration if the candidate wins, so it is likely that those leadership styles will persist in the 
new administration. (A list of the key national security advisors to both candidates is provided in 
Appendix B.) Policy proposals are generally vague during the campaign and begin to take on more 
shape during the transition. In most cases, the transition is when you need to start paying close 
attention to the details. 
Issue:  The outgoing administration’s “Last 100 Days” agenda    
What to look for:   
Despite the moniker “lame duck,” the sitting president is hardly without power. Transitions 
have been characterized as a period when the president’s authority is like “a large balloon with a 
slow leak,”4 but historical evidence shows a spike in activity by the outgoing team. This spike is 
likely related to the outgoing team’s desire to ensure its legacy in particular policy areas. As Howell 
and Mayer describe it, “The president’s capacity to negotiate, broker deals, and ultimately persuade 
is, at last, depleted. His power, however, is not.”5 The administration can continue to wield power 
through unilateral actions such as executive orders, especially when the out-party succeeds the in-
party.6  Research shows that outgoing presidents also issue more executive orders during states of 
                                                             
4 Pfiffner, p. 5. 
5 William G. Howell and Kenneth R. Mayer, “The Last One Hundred Days,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 
35(2005): 537. 
6 Kenneth Mayer and Kevin Price, “Unilateral Presidential Powers: Significant Executive Orders, 1949-1999,” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly, 32 (2002): 367-386. 
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war, when the president is relatively unpopular, and the economy is weak, all conditions we face in 
20087. The outgoing administration also issues new rules and regulations, as evidenced by an 
increase in pages in the Federal Register.8 Such orders and rules may constrain the incoming 
president, especially if there is a political cost to undoing them; for example, Bush (43) discovered 
how difficult it was to try to reverse the clean water standards for arsenic that Clinton approved 
three days before leaving office.  
The outgoing administration may also attempt to secure its legacy in other ways. For 
example, the Johnson administration was concerned about the continuation of housing programs 
when Nixon assumed office. They ensured key programs were well funded in the subsequent year 
budget proposal which the incoming team had little time to adjust between the January 
inauguration and February budget submittal to Congress. The Johnson administration made the 
program a frequent topic of White House interest to create bureaucratic momentum. Lastly, during 
the campaign, the Johnson team made small concessions to Nixon’s counter-agenda, thereby 
limiting the range of policy proposals available to Nixon once he took office.9  
Another way the outgoing administration may look to secure its legacy is to award major 
contracts, even prematurely, to keep a program alive if the incoming team has threatened to slow or 
stop it. The logic here is clear: It is harder to undo a contract than not to sign it.  
George Bush has already taken steps to protect his own legacy. In preparation for the 
upcoming transition, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England issued a memorandum to 
departmental leaders back in August, 2007, which listed 25 goals to be “institutionalized by 
December, 2008,” all of which were related to the completion of “a major milestone.”10  President 
Bush approved the list before it was published.11 While some of the goals related to military 
operations such as the war in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay, others dealt with management reform in 
financial management and acquisition.  
What to do about it  
What the outgoing administration puts in motion on its way out, the career executives must 
implement. Some career executives may welcome the actions if they support their own program or 
policy; however, others will be frustrated by the hasty and potentially wasteful decisions. 
Regardless of one’s attitude toward the actions, however, there will be tremendous pressure on 
career executives to reach key milestones before the transfer of leadership. Until that transfer, the 
outgoing administration is still the legitimate governing body, and thus there is a responsibility to 
execute their policies. Beyond one’s ethical responsibility, there are pragmatic considerations as 
well. Rushed implementation of policies draws management attention from other important 
aspects of the transition. The content of transition book and briefing materials may be evolving or 
misleading, which could affect the credibility of the career executive with the new administration. 
New policies may not be well understood or completely vetted, hindering their implementation. 
And it may be difficult to properly advise the new team in the presence of such change. Subsequent 
Issues (transition books, arrival of new team, and changes to policy agenda) are also germane. 
                                                             
7 Kenneth Mayer, “Executive Orders and Presidential Power,” The Journal of Politics, 61 (1999): 445-466 and George A. 
Krause and Jeffery E. Cohen, “Opportunity, Constraints, and the Development of the Institutional Presidency: The Issuance 
of Executive Orders, 1939-96,” The Journal of Politics, 62 (2000): 88-114. 
8 Howell and Mayer. 
9 Joseph L. Zentner,  “Presidential Transitions and the Perpetuation of Programs: The Johnson-Nixon Experience,” The 
Western Political Quarterly, 25(1972): 5-15. 
10 Gordon England, DoD Transformation Priorities, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum of August 9, 2007. 
Washington, DC. 
11 Kristin Roberts,  “Pentagon sets goals to hit before end of Bush term,” Reuters August 20, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USN2039180420070820  (May 11, 2008). 
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Issue: Administrative aspects to transition 
What to look for 
Several administrative matters need to be dealt with throughout the transition; namely, the 
budget, the transfer of authority, and general transition coordination activities.  First, the outgoing 
administration prepares the subsequent year’s budget to hand off to the new administration, albeit 
in somewhat less detail than normal. The outgoing administration wants to ensure their policy 
preferences are included, and they know that the inexperienced, time-pressured incoming team 
will be forced to accept most of it.12  This plan is already in motion for 2008; OMB tasked each 
agency to prepare a basic budget by early November, one that reflects the Bush administration’s 
priorities, to hand to the president-elect.  
Second, the outgoing administration takes responsibility for the orderly transition of 
authority. There are historical precedents that provide some clues as to how that will happen. For 
example, in 2000, President Clinton established a Presidential Transition Coordinating Council 
chaired by his Chief of Staff. He instructed GSA and the Office of Government Ethics to conduct 
orientations for the new team and implement the provisions of the Presidential Transition Act.  He 
also instructed the departments and agencies to prepare briefing materials to the incoming team.13 
President Bush will likely take similar steps. Under the provisions of the Presidential Transition 
Acts, funds are provided to both the incoming and outgoing administrations for temporary office 
space, office staff, telecommunications, travel, consultants and the orientation of new appointees.14  
Third, beginning months ahead of the election, staff elements in the department such as the 
Office of Deputy for Administration and Management at OSD look at the files of past transitions and 
develop lists of things necessary to effect a smooth transition. There are numerous administrative 
tasks associated with wrapping up the affairs of the exiting team and preparing for the new team. 
When Secretary Rumsfeld stepped down, he was granted office support for several weeks to get his 
papers and affairs in order. The new team will need security clearances, parking spaces, computer 
access, and indoctrination training on critical processes and organizational relationships. Deputy 
Secretary England named a transition coordinator for the department in August.  
 What to do about it  
Much of this work occurs at the highest levels of the department and within their support 
staffs. This activity will persist in the background, distracting senior leaders, and occupying the 
time of many of the staff offices. You will do little to move this process along, other than respond to 
the occasional “data call,” but you should understand this process is time consuming and will 
compete with your issues for their attention. You need to be increasingly self-reliant. Once the new 
appointees arrive, and you know who you’ll be working with, the material provided in Issue #7 may 
be helpful.   
                                                             
12 Inauguration Day is January 20, the budget is due to Congress the first Monday in February. There are only 
15 days available to the new administration to change the budget. 
13 William J. Clinton, Facilitation of a Presidential Transition, Presidential Executive Order (EO 13176) of 
November 27, 2000. 
14 Stephanie Smith, Presidential Transitions, CRS Report for Congress, Report Number RL30736, updated 
December 27, 2007. 
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Issue: Transition books & briefs 
What to look for 
The agencies and/or functional areas are expected to produce briefing materials for the 
new transition team. Even before the election, the candidates form transition teams that are distinct 
from their campaign teams; these transition teams develop a prospective policy agenda and 
implementation plan. The transition team may be organized in different ways. For example, the 
Bush (43) team primarily organized along government department lines. Clinton’s team was a 
matrix with “executive branch agency clusters” and cross-cutting “policy departments” including 
health, budget, economy, domestic and foreign, all reporting to a transition board.15  The policy 
agenda may be based in the candidate’s own ideals, planks in the party platform, contemporary 
issues in the media or in the public eye, or they may originate outside the party by interest groups 
who seek an ally. The transition team develops policy implementation strategies which take two 
forms: those the executive branch can implement under existing legislation, and those that require 
new legislation.  
Crafting the agenda and developing implementation capabilities takes advance planning. 
Immediately after the election, the President-elect’s transition teams will descend on Washington 
and appear inside executive agencies and departments. The transition team’s goals are to 
understand the state of affairs of the agencies, to understand the critical processes that operate 
within them, to understand and take a position on current and near-term issues confronting them, 
and to refine the policy agenda and implementation plans.  
To help educate the transition teams, the agencies will prepare briefing materials for them; 
Figure 1 outlines a typical briefing book. Depending on the structure of the transition team, there 
may be several requests for information from the agencies. On the other hand, there may be 
surprisingly little coordination, depending on the level of trust among the transition team, the 
outgoing team, and the bureaucracy. The transition team may instead rely on its own staff, 
consultants, and think tanks for information.  
The briefing books contain information that is politically necessary, but not very helpful 
administratively. As the transition team digests this information and formulates policy positions, 
they will normally seek additional information to consider policy implementation. More specific 
issues are discussed in these subsequent requests for information.  
                                                             
15 Raymon R. Bruce, “The Succession of the President and the Vice President: Managing the Change,” Public 
Administration Quarterly, 20 (1996): 26-51. 
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What to do about it  
Remember that the transition is part political and part administrative. The incoming team 
will first set the political agenda. They will decide which issues are primary and which are 
secondary. You may or may not be asked for input for the briefing books—it is very possible the 
outgoing political leadership will want to control the content and tone. If given the opportunity, 
think strategically about your input. What first impression do you want the new team to have? We 
know that both campaigns are running on platforms of change, and both have explicitly mentioned 
some business processes in DoD as areas of concern. BTA should portray itself as a tool for new 
administration to effect those changes. Stress your mission, the support you have had on the Hill, 
and successes in the areas the candidates are concerned about. 
                                                             
16 Adapted from Michael S. Hamilton, “The Career Service and Presidential Transition: From Bush to Clinton 
to National Performance Review,” Public Administration Quarterly, 20 (1996): 52-70. 
 
 Statement of the functions and mission of the organization 
 Summary of authorizing legislation 
 Current strategy documents, goals, objectives, and status 
 Last year’s performance information (e.g., PART) 
 Organization Chart 
 List of key personnel at headquarters and in the field with contact 
information 
 List of significant agency or department alumni (both political and 
career) by position with contact information 
 List of significant directives 
 List of major decisions in the past 3-6 months 
 List of issues pending decision in the next 3-6 months 
 List of recent reports and in-progress work by the Inspector  
 General, Government Accountability Office, advisory boards, or 
commissions 
 List of reports and documents to be released in the next 3-6 
months 
 Summaries of pending legal issues and court cases 
 List of key constituency groups including Congressional 
committees and subcommittees 
 Status of internal controls 
 Problem areas political designees should be aware of prior to 
confirmation hearings 
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Issue:  Organizational and personal response to change 
What to look for 
During the campaign, career executives consider the effects of the transition on the policy 
direction of their agencies, as well as the management decisions they face in the remaining months 
of the current administration. They also begin to think about the possible futures that confront 
them, both on a personal and professional level. Because 2008 is an open contest, someone 
unaffiliated with the present administration will be the next president—even the in-party 
candidate has significant ideological differences with the sitting president. Preparation for 
inevitable change has certain predictable characteristics. 
This is not just a time of political change, it is a time of organizational change that career 
executives need to recognize and actively manage. Typically, organizations respond to an externally 
driven change by becoming more rigid and task-oriented. The members of the organization do not 
know the exact nature of this change, so they will gravitate towards the familiar and comfortable. 
They will focus on their daily work and their enduring relationships. There is typically less risk-
taking and a higher need for control. Authority is centralized, and the organization can become rigid 
from increased group cohesion. These trends become most pronounced in the middle management 
ranks as they attempt to keep work going, but are unsure about the future. Ironically, this 
organizational rigidity occurs just when it most needs to be flexible to cope with the change. Just as 
one’s body tenses before an imminent traffic accident, so does an organization in anticipation of the 
external shock.17  
In addition to organizational stresses, the career executives individually may be anxious 
about the coming change. Familiarity and clarity of roles and relationships are replaced by the fog 
of the unknown which is eventually replaced by a new clarity. Roles are likely to change, the 
relative importance of functions within the department or agency will probably shift, once-
important programs may be scaled back or cancelled, and one needs to adapt to the nature of the 
next political boss. Additionally, communication patterns will change and centers of influence will 
diminish or change significantly. These changes are especially pronounced when organizational 
relationships have depended on the personalities of the political appointees. One consequence of 
the uncertainties is that just at the time career executives need to position themselves to fill the 
leadership vacuum between inauguration and installation of the new political team (the next two 
Issues elaborate on this), they can become more self-centered and potentially less committed to the 
agency.18  
History shows that while the new administration is impatient to implement its agenda, the 
prospect of change renders the bureaucracy less capable of responding to those needs. Thus we 
find two strains on the bureaucracy: one between a need to be responsive and a tendency to 
become rigid, and another between the inherent continuity of a bureaucracy and the need for it to 
change.19 The strain is particularly pronounced if the incoming team establishes a policy position 
antithetical to the one that had been operating, as was the case with Reagan and the EPA, and with 
                                                             
17 Zentner; Douglas T. Hall & Roger Mansfield, “Organizational and Individual Responses to External Stress,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 16 (1971): 533-547; and Gregory H. Gaertner, Karen N. Gaertner and Irene 
Devine, “Federal Agencies in the Context of Transition: A Contrast between Democratic and Organizational 
Theories,” Public Administration Review, 43 (1983): 421-432. 
18 Gaertner, Gaertner, and Devine. 
19 Ibid. 
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Nixon and the housing policy.20 We can expect that there will be stresses in DoD in 2009, 
particularly related to organizational change management.  
What to do about it 
You will need to reallocate your time and concentrate on striking an appropriate balance 
among the competing demands of the transition activities, routine work, and organizational change 
dynamics. The lower levels of the organization may find comfort in working the routine issues, 
giving you room and a good rationale to delegate routine matters. This delegation also frees your 
time to fill the vacuum if the new political leaders are not yet appointed. If they are appointed, you 
may use this time to develop working relationships with them and to establish the new direction 
for the agency.  
To mitigate the ill effects of the environmental change to the agency, pay particular 
attention to your role as a communication conduit. It is important to communicate clearly and often 
to alleviate anxiety which can lead to organizational rigidity. Organizations despise a vacuum, and 
sometimes it’s better to share your own uncertainty and say you don’t know than to say nothing at 
all; better that the organization hear something, and better they hear it from you as opposed to 
other avenues.  
It is normal for agency heads to also feel their own personal anxiety, for the similar reasons 
that cause stress for agency employees: the uncertainty is real. Nonetheless, the agency will be 
looking to the agency head for confidence, power, and control; portraying that confidence can truly 
help mitigate the anxiety in the organization. (Note: Later Issues address the executive’s evolving 
role and other ways to address organizational uncertainty.) 
Issue:  The leadership vacuum 
What to look for 
There is a time, within the transition, where there will be a leadership vacuum. Once the 
election is over, the outgoing team will begin wrapping up affairs. Political appointees are expected 
to stay until January 20th, but not all of them will. Meanwhile, the president-elect’s transition team 
will make personnel appointments a high priority. However, with about 4000 presidential 
appointments to fill, tens of thousands of applications to review,21 and a careful vetting process to 
undergo, only the top tier or two of political appointees will arrive in the first weeks after 
Inauguration. The third and fourth tier appointees (e.g., military department Assistant Secretaries, 
Deputy Undersecretaries of Defense) may well be vacant for several months. Within this time 
period, the career executives will be expected to fill the void in the leadership ranks. Understanding 
this issue, one of the 25 goals that Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England set to be completed 
by December, 2008 (see the second Issue) was to avoid a leadership vacuum.22  
What to do about it 
Preventing the leadership vacuum means two things: filling the roles during the vacancy, 
and facilitating the personnel appointment and installation process. Some of what happens to an 
individual career executive is affected by positioning and chance. Whether one is selected to fill a 
gap depends on the executive, his/her reporting relationship to a vacant role, and the desires of the 
                                                             
20 See Patricia W. Ingraham (1988) “Transition and Policy Change in Washington,” Public Productivity Review, 12(1988), 
page 61-72, and Zentner. 
21 Clinton asked everyone involved in the transition for a resume, solicited more, and accepted unsolicited ones, resulting 
in a database of 200,000 (see Bruce.). Bush took a more limited approach, but according to Clay Johnson, still received 
“about 40,000 in a few weeks time.” (Johnson; p. 53).  
22 Gordon England, DoD Transformation Priorities, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum of August 9 2007. 
Washington, DC. 
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political appointee in the filled position above that role. Those interested in filling such gaps should 
tactfully make those desires known to more senior executives and to the transition team, if asked. 
Transition briefings provide an opportunity for you to demonstrate your knowledge of the agency, 
the transition process, and your willingness to assist. 
Someone must fulfill the functions of a vacant position whether formally designated as 
Acting or not. Obviously, during the transition, it is still important for executives to ensure 
government continues to function effectively and efficiently. So, if a role is going to be vacant, you 
can put temporary procedures in place to fulfill critical processes before the outgoing team departs, 
particularly those processes that require decision-making. Additionally, during the leadership 
vacuum, it is important establish clear lines of authority to mitigate the absence of key positions 
and the potential organizational challenges that may arise as a result.  
Issue: The arrival of the new team 
 
What to look for 
Some presidents, like Nixon, attempt to manage the executive branch with a strong hand 
from the White House, whereas others, like Carter, take a more decentralized approach. Reagan and 
G. W. Bush chose appointees who were ideologically aligned; Clinton favored technical competence 
and diversity over ideology. Both candidates in 2008 have stressed during their campaigns a desire 
to limit the influence of the “revolving door” through which politicians and lobbyists trade favors. 
They are expected to carefully manage the appointment process to avoid any appearance of 
impropriety. Appointees may come from the campaign, the executive career workforce, from 
Congress and its agencies, from the business community, or from nonprofit groups and academia. 
When the election brings about a change of party, the “government in exile”—former political 
appointees that are from the newly elected party—comes forward to fill critical roles. Don 
Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney were two contemporary examples of those were out in the Clinton 
years, but back in when Bush was elected.  
As the new president places his people into the executive branch to shape the new policy 
agenda, they need to be assimilated. Those with little government experience need to quickly learn 
the basics of the operation of the federal government in general and the agency in particular. 
Political veterans may have been away from government and need less time to catch up. They 
should depend on the career workforce for guidance and understanding, but history shows that 
many do not, for two reasons.  
First, incoming teams have historically suffered from hubris, particularly when the 
president won by a large margin. They will perceive they have been given a mandate. If they are 
inexperienced, they may be naïve. And, whether experienced or not, will often act hastily to initiate 
the new administration’s policy agenda. They will not look at the career executives as part of the 
team, but rather as the object they were sent to manage or change. 
Second, the incoming team will view the career executives skeptically. Many will consider 
them holdovers of the last administration and beholden to the existing policies. Some will consider 
the loyalty to the former administration that had been demonstrated during the transition as a sign 
of ideological alignment. They will also misinterpret organizational resistance to change as 
opposition. In all cases, particularly in the Defense Department, they will be misinterpreting the 
signals and may attempt to seize control.  
A study of transitions concluded that the newly arriving political team should expect some 
level of natural resistance which “should not be interpreted as opposition, but rather as predictable 
reactions to the process of change. Increased efforts at control are more likely to increase 
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resistance than to reduce it.”23  Career employees in DoD understand better than most federal 
employees what is involved in a change at the top. Admirals and generals come and go in elaborate 
ceremonies that rival presidential inaugurations. Power and authority, and the organization’s 
respect and compliance, transfer instantaneously; not gradually. While the transition team for the 
incoming administration will witness loyalty to the Bush administration until January 20th, that 
loyalty does not so much evidence ideological alignment and a problem for the new team; rather, it 
signals the type of loyalty that awaits the new team. But, the incoming team may not view it that 
way. 
What to do about it   
First, the career workforce must perform the administrative tasks of placing the new 
appointees: things like computer access, security badges, parking places. Before the arrival of the 
newly installed appointee, the career executives have arranged briefings and meetings with the 
appointee’s counterparts inside and outside the agency as well as with the appointees’ direct 
reports. These activities help ensure that the first week of the new administration is productive and 
the career workforce appears competent.  
Agency heads and career executives are in an excellent position to assist the new political 
leadership. Such assistance may be in the form of advice on policy formation, advice on policy 
implementation opportunities and hurdles, suggested improvements to the plans the appointee 
undoubtedly arrives with, and instructions to the appointee on key internal processes. You will 
want to help, but understand that you may be viewed suspiciously. Overenthusiastic support for 
existing programs may reinforce the belief that you are a holdover of the former team. The most 
important thing for the career executive is to personify the civil service ideal of neutral competence. 
Be professional, supportive, and deferential.  
At a more personal level, seek to understand the point of view of the incoming team. 
Consider their backgrounds, frames of reference, organizational views, and their biases.24 For 
example, an appointee with a background as a Congressional staffer will approach the job 
differently than one who was previously a corporate executive. The more one can align with the 
new administration’s agenda, the more successful the transition and ultimate relationship will be.  
Gradually, you and the new appointee will reach an agreement on the boundaries of roles 
and responsibilities and the norms of your working relationship. Being aware of the transition 
dynamics in advance may shorten the time it takes to get to that level of understanding.  
Issue:  Changes to the policy agenda  
What to look for   
Both candidates are campaigning on a platform of change. Each intends to take DoD in new 
directions, and some of those new directions involve business reform. The new team will likely 
establish a clear set of policy priorities and choose a limited number of them for immediate 
attention. Other, relatively minor campaign issues will be deferred. In the more successful 
transitions, the White House chose a limited number of issues to pursue and made them the center 
of attention. But selecting the agenda is only half the work; the new administration must implement 
the agenda and that takes the work of the career workforce. 
In her study of the Department of Transportation and the Office of Housing and Urban 
Development, Patricia Ingraham noted, “If elected officials wish their efforts to be fully productive, 
they must begin with a better understanding of internal management processes in public 
                                                             
23 Gaertner, Gaertner, and Devine, p. 431. 
24 Hal G. Rainey and Barton Wechsler, “Executive-Level Transition: Toward a Conceptual Framework,” Public Productivity 
Review, 12 (1988): 45-60. 
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organizations.”25  Such understanding is held by the career workforce and must be acquired by the 
new political leadership. Thus, good working relationships between the new administration’s 
political appointees and the career executives in the agencies are important. The Nixon 
administration attempted to seize control of the bureaucracy from within the White House and 
Cabinet with only limited success. Carter overcompensated and decentralized power and had even 
less success. It is not so much about centralization or decentralization as it is learning and 
alignment of efforts. 
What to do about it   
Career executives are an important resource because they possess critical knowledge to 
help formulate new policies, and they are the only ones who can ensure the implementation of 
those new policies. Make time in the new appointee’s calendar for briefings on the fundamental 
processes of the agency, particularly those that involve decision-making. In the early weeks of the 
appointee’s tenure, offer more background materials on issues than you normally would. Leave 
room in their calendar for background reading and informal discussions. When decisions need to be 
made, present the facts authoritatively and, if the appointee is receptive, offer your personal 
perspective on what course of action you think would be most beneficial and why.  
Because you are responsible for implementing the agenda, and because your organization is 
suffering change dynamics, offer to be part of the team that formulates implementation plans. This 
will permit you to develop faster and (if all goes well) better working relationships, it gives you 
more information earlier to share with your organization to ease the change, and it should result in 
better conceived plans. An important way to express your support to the new administration is to 
be candid and forthright about what is working and what is not.  
Presidential transitions: Summary 
The issues above do not constitute a comprehensive picture of all that occurs in a 
presidential transition, but they do cover the major concerns for career executives in the Defense 
Department. Remember that you are the lynchpin between politics and administration. You 
facilitate the change, yet you also maintain the bureaucratic momentum that keeps the business of 
defense going. Several themes are evident in the transition dynamic and the suggested response:  
Know when to engage  
Just as a fighter pilot continuously maintains situational awareness and only sometimes 
actively engages, so, too, should the career executive, especially in the early phases of transition. 
Sometimes the best thing to do is simply keep your eyes and ears open and think about how your 
agency is affected by the new agenda.  
They may not realize how much they need you  
If the new team behaves similar to previous administrations, they will view you 
suspiciously: you may be part of the problem they were elected to fix or you may be a holdover of 
the last regime. They will also only realize over time that the only way they can implement their 
agenda is through you. You should demonstrate that your loyalty is to whoever is in the position of 
authority. This requires a servant leader attitude. You should demonstrate a competence and 
proficiency that is apolitical.  
Transition is both environmental and internal  
Your agency will go through a fairly predictable change dynamic and you need to guide 
them through that change. They are going to become rigid at a time when flexibility is important 
                                                             
25 Patricia W. Ingraham (1988) “Transition and Policy Change in Washington,” Public Productivity Review 12(1), page 64. 
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and authoritative leadership styles are likely to backfire. Clear and persistent communication, 
direction, and clear lines of authority are important. 
 
Your primary activity is risk management 
There are threats to your agency which must be countered. There are opportunities which 
should be exploited. There are changes which need to be managed. Managing the transition means 
understanding the nature of these risks, identifying the most salient ones and mitigating their 
effects. Along with risk comes opportunity and the career executive should be poised to recognize 
and exploit those. 
   The Business Reform Trajectory 
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Section 3: The Business Reform Trajectory 
Each presidential administration brings its own management reform agenda to bear on the 
agencies of the federal government. Defense, as the largest agency and one replete with business 
management problems, is the frequent subject of specific reforms. The Clinton administration 
attempted to “reinvent” government while the Bush administration attempted to “transform” it. 
The next administration will undoubtedly have its own reform agenda, and it will be situated along 
the recent history of reform movements.  
In this section we report on the trends in management reform in the federal government 
and, specifically, in DoD. We examined those trends from three vantage points.  First, we examined 
the management reform agendas of the past six secretaries of defense, three Democrats and three 
Republicans, and looked at the areas they emphasized. Second, we examined the published work of 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and analyzed trends in the functional domains of those 
reports. Third, we reviewed the writings of academics and practitioners that address the upcoming 
transition, research that covers both the issues the next administration is likely to face (either by 
design, inheritance or happenstance) as well as things the new administration ought to do. 
Combining these views, we describe what the reform trajectory is shaping up to be. 
This background is important to the Defense Business Transformation Agency (BTA) as 
they face the upcoming presidential transition. Throughout the recent history, some reforms were 
internally driven by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) under the direction of the 
President and his Office of Management and Budget (OMB), whereas others were externally driven 
by Congress and its agencies, such as the GAO. The next administration and Congress will inherit 
the present situation and will attempt to implement their own views. Having a broad understanding 
of this history and these dynamics can help BTA leadership forge strategies. 
We do not describe in detail the current reform status believing that is already well-known 
by BTA leadership. A well-written summary exists in the July 2008 Department of Defense Strategic 
Management Plan. 
OSD reform agendas 
In 2006, the Center for Defense Management Reform published a comprehensive survey of 
the management reform initiatives of the Secretaries of Defense from Forrestal through Rumsfeld.26 
Using self-reported data from the annual Secretary of Defense reports to Congress, the authors 
catalogued 513 reform initiatives and classified them along several dimensions. For this study, we 
looked specifically at the last six secretaries, three from each political party, to assess whether there 
is any difference in their areas of emphasis or overall degree of reform.  
 We found that the number of reform initiatives in general has increased over time. 
Acquisition and logistics reforms are the most common but, under some administrations, 
organizational structure reforms are slightly higher. These organizational reforms include 
reorganizations, the creation of new organizations, the elimination of old organizations, and 
personnel reforms. Reforms of financial management and budgeting systems are the third most 
common, and those involving infrastructure, facilities or energy usage policy are the least common.  
 
 
                                                             
26 Daniel B. Francis and Robin J. Walther, A Comparative History of Department of Defense Management Reform 
from 1947 to 2005, (Monterey, CA: Center for Defense Management Reform Report NPS-CDMR-GM-06-009, 
2006).  
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Figure 2: Reform Emphasis by Area and Political Party 



























































There were two differences across political parties, as shown in Figure 1. First, Democrats 
had more reform initiatives than Republicans, even though they served less time in office. We found 
that reforms during Democratic administrations concentrated on acquisition and logistics more so 
than organizational structure. Republicans, on the other hand, stressed organizational structure 
more than acquisition. Both parties had fewer reforms in the financial and infrastructure areas.  
Republicans initiated fewer than half the reforms, over time, as Democrats. Given the 
conservative reputation of the Republican Party and progressive reputation of the Democratic 
Party, this pattern is understandable. Clinton’s Defense Secretary, William Cohen was the outlier 
with over 80 initiatives. Defense secretaries Rumsfeld, Perry, Aspin and Cheney had two to three 
dozen each, regardless of the length of their tenure, so they may represent the norm. There is no 
apparent increase in the number of reforms when one political party displaces another. We can 
only conclude that the new secretary—regardless of party—will behave more like the norm and 
initiate two or three dozen new reforms. Both parties are campaigning on a rhetoric of change in 
the 2008 presidential race, with the Democrats pushing slightly harder in that direction. 
Consequently, it seems reasonable to expect the scope of reforms to be in the normal range (24-36) 
and, if the Democrat wins, the scope may be at the higher end of the range. 
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Government Accountability Office 
As the federal government’s central audit agency, the Government Accountability Office is a 
both a tool of accountability and an agent for improvement of the operation of the federal 
government. As noted in their annual Performance and Accountability Report, “GAO performs a 
range of oversight-, insight-, and foresight-related engagements, a vast majority of which are 
conducted in response to Congressional mandates or requests. GAO’s engagements include federal 
program and performance evaluations, financial and management audits, policy analyses, legal 
opinions, bid protest adjudications, and investigations.”27 Because their products range from 
oversight to foresight, they can serve as an indicator of both contemporary problems and 
prospective areas of concern. We conducted two reviews of the GAO’s work. 
In the first review, we queried the GAO’s database for all reports containing either the word 
“transformation” or the phrase “management reform” in the title or abstract, irrespective of bureau 
or agency evaluated. We pulled data from January 2000 to April 2008, generating 362 reports. 
Reports that were not evaluative in nature, such as legal opinions or the annual report summarizing 
the GAO’s budget request, were eliminated. The report titles were then sorted into 15 categories 
based on the functional area evaluated:  contracting, human resources, program effectiveness, 
information technology, and the like. A total of 298 unique report titles28 remained. Some reports 
covered more than one functional area. For example, a report about the use of information 
technology to improve financial management would be listed in both the financial management and 
the information technology categories. In the end, our dataset had 340 items.   
The data reveal increasing numbers of reports about management reform, starting with 15 
in 2000 and rising quickly to 50 in 2003. Overall, a little more than one-third were focused on the 
DoD with two years, 2005 and 2006, above the trend. Figure 2 displays the data from the three 
most recent complete years in descending order of frequency (dark bars) and compares them to the 
first three years of the data set (light bars) to reveal any trends. Recently, the most common areas 
have been human resources, program effectiveness, DoD business transformation, and general 
management reform. There is a fairly wide distribution of functional areas with the top three 
accounting for 46% of the 131 studies. Comparing these data with the first three years of the data 
set , we see there has not only been an increase in the number of reports, there has been a shift in 
emphasis.  There was more concentration of emphasis in this earlier period, especially in the areas 
of financial management, program effectiveness and human resources. 
 
                                                             
27 United States Government Accountability Office, Performance and Accountability Report (Washington, DC: 
GAO, 2007). Available from http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1SP Accessed: 24 July 2008. 
28 In some cases, a report is issued concurrent with testimony by a member of GAO or the Comptroller 
General himself. The database query would generate two documents, the report and the hearing transcript. 
Since the hearing transcript is normally just a summary of the report findings, these situations were only 
counted once. 
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Figure 3: Government-wide GAO Reports on Management Reform 
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Our second review concentrated specifically on the Defense Department. Using a similar 
methodology, we examined the last 400 reports on the DoD. They logically sorted into 15 categories 
and are displayed in Figure 3. The topic most frequently addressed was systems acquisition, 
followed by human resources to include both civilian and uniformed matters, and matters related 
to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are some business-like matters imbedded in many of the 
non-businesslike categories, and so they were coded in two groups. For instance, a report on 
oversight of contracting in Iraq appears in both “War” and “Contracting.” The categories containing 
most of the business reform reports, in descending order, include acquisition, human resources, 
contracting, maintenance/logistics, financial management / budgeting, information technology, and 
business transformation. 
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Figure 4: GAO Reports on DoD by Functional Area, 2006-2008 
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Considering the government-wide data along with the DoD-specific data, what are the 
trends in GAO evaluation and reporting?  First, GAO has emphasized program effectiveness over the 
past decade and one can expect that trend to continue. Second, we notice that acquisition program 
performance is a significant interest item. DoD’s portfolio of acquisition programs continues to 
grow as its cost and schedule performance deteriorates.29 GAO is unlikely to lessen its emphasis in 
this area. Given the controversy surrounding the National Security Personnel System, the aging 
workforce, and matters of recruitment and retention of the uniformed forces, we can expect HR to 
remain a frequent topic. There have been downward trends in the frequency of reviews in the areas 
of financial management, budgeting and government-wide performance measurement. Should the 
next administration replace the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) and Program Assessment 
Rating Tool (PART), and it is very likely that a Democratic administration will, one can expect GAO 
                                                             
29 United States Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Summary 
Update for Fiscal Year 2008, (Washington, DC: CBO, December 2007) and United States Government 
Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Weapons Programs (Washington, DC: GAO, 
Report GAO-08-467SP, March 2008). 
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to assess the efficacy of the new programs just as they did the PMA and PART during the Bush 
administration.  
When GAO is interested in government management reform, DoD is a likely subject. This is 
probably due to the scope of DoD’s imprint in terms of dollars spent and personnel employed 
combined with its large presence on GAO’s High Risk list.30 However, when GAO looks at DoD, it is 
more interested in the performance of acquisition programs and personnel matters, probably due 
to the significant amount of resources in those areas. The war will continue to get attention. And 
due to war casualties and the nationwide trend in rising health care costs, so will medical matters. 
Both presidential candidates have emphasized reforming contracting practices which could lead to 
additional evaluation and oversight in that area. 
 
Academics and Practitioners  
We looked through the recent writings of both academics and practitioners (we will refer to 
them collectively as pundits) related to management reform and the transition. We found two 
themes: those that predict the issues that will be important to the new president and those that 
suggest courses of action for the next administration. There is some overlap between the two sets. 
What do the pundits say will be the management issues that confront the next president? 
Donald Kettl (University of Pennsylvania) and Steve Kellman (Harvard) authored a pair of essays 
for the IBM Center for the Business of Government. Kettl argued there are five imperatives facing 
the next administration (emphases in original):  
 A policy agenda that focuses more on problems than on structures 
 Political accountability that works more through results than on processes 
 Public administration that functions more organically, through networks, than rigidly 
through hierarchy 
 Political leadership that works more by leveraging action than simply by making decisions 
 Citizenship that works more through engagement than remoteness.31  
 
Kettl envisions an administration that is further confronted with the complexity and 
demands of modern society; in other words, that the focus is on problems and results rather than 
the structures and bureaus of government; that effective solutions require a network of actors both 
inside and outside government; that government is more about facilitating that network than 
attempting to produce results exclusively; and that citizens expect to be more substantively 
engaged.  
In his companion piece, Kellman expands on Kettl’s list and warns of the risk of becoming 
preoccupied with ferreting out waste, fraud and abuse; exposing mismanagement; and complying 
with rules and procedures. He sees trends similar to those noted by Kettl facing the next 
administration: a greater emphasis on performance measurement and management, a need for 
improved contract management and interorganizational collaboration; demands for more choice 
and competition; and the pressure for efficiency-promoting budget reforms.32  
If those are the issues that will confront the next administration, what should the next 
president do given this environment, these trends, and those expectations?  In a more recent piece, 
                                                             
30 United States Government Accountability Office, High Risk Series: An Update. (Washington, DC: GAO, Report GAO-07-
310, January 2007). 
31 Donald F. Kettl, “The Next Government of the United States: Challenges for Performance in the 21st Century,” in 
Reflections on 21st Century Government Management, 2008 Presidential Transition Series, (Washington, DC: IBM Center for 
the Business of Government, 2005).  Available at: http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/KettlKelmanReport.pdf 
(April 10, 2008).   
32 Steven Kellman “The Transformation of Government in the Decade Ahead,” in Reflections on 21st Century Government 
Management, 2008 Presidential Transition Series (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2006) 
Available at: http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/KettlKelmanReport.pdf (March 10, 2008).   
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Kettl offers recommendations along four tracks: fiscal, personnel, performance, and priorities. First, 
he recommends a comprehensive federal fiscal policy that seeks to remedy the imbalance between 
expected revenues and outlays. Second, in the domain of personnel policies, he suggests expanding 
civil service reform beyond DoD and DHS to the entire federal government and to do so in a manner 
that addresses the “crisis of competence” facing the government as the baby boomers in public 
service retire. Also on the topic of personnel reform, he recommends reducing the number of 
political appointees and changing policies that encourage the revolving door between special 
interest groups and government. Third, the new administration should focus on performance, 
“forging ahead with positive reforms from the Clinton and Bush administrations, and looking to 
lessons from the past to determine what government ought to do differently.” He also suggests 
greater emphasis on performance management — specifically, the ability to link program results to 
budgets. Fourth, the next president should prioritize his attention, focusing on those items on the 
GAO High Risk list, especially outsourcing and contract management.33 
In a piece looking specifically at the defense department, Kurt Campbell and Michèle 
Flournoy (both former DoD political appointees) outline defense-related matters a new 
administration should do to address the “complex mix of challenges and opportunities” presented 
by the war, military overextensions, strategic preoccupation and public disillusionment.” They cite 
a need to restore U.S. moral authority and credibility, primarily by demonstrating recognition that 
alliances, partnerships and coalitions are necessary. They also urge a revitalization of the U.S. 
military to ease the strain on the force, to adapt to new threats, and to rethink when it is 
appropriate to use force.34  
Looking specifically at the management side of DoD, Pete Singer, writing for Brookings’ 
Opportunity 08 series, presents his own list of issues that merit attention by the next 
administration. His list is representative of what many have said in this domain: the force is 
stretched thin, but not broken, and needs to be the focus of a multi-pronged approach.  In addition 
to personnel and acquisition portfolio recommendations, he addresses processes. He suggests a 
reform of the acquisition process to include a better integration of requirements with budgets and 
the evaluation of acquisition program management. He also suggests ending the abuse of 
supplemental appropriations.35  
To summarize, the pundits see an increasingly complex context for defense business 
management, but believe the trends in public management over the past several years should 
continue: a focus on results rather than process, reliance on networks of governmental and non-
governmental actors, greater transparency and performance management. The pundits suggest the 
next administration focus their management reform agendas on these areas of particular concern to 
DoD: 
 Performance management – linking resources to measurable results and increasing 
program evaluation proficiency, with special emphasis on the materiel component of 
resetting the force and ensuring readiness across a wider spectrum of operations; 
 Transparency and accountability – promulgating performance information, more 
open processes and shared data, and less reliance on contractors in policy-making 
areas; 
 Personnel - continued attention to civil service reform and managing the exodus of 
experienced civilian workers; recruitment, retention and utilization of the uniformed 
force; 
                                                             
33 Donald F. Kettl, “Advice+Dissent: Viewpoint Fixing the Future,” Government Executive January 1, 2008. 
Available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0228defense_singer_Opp08.aspx (April 30, 2008).  
34 Kurt M. Campbell and Michèle A. Fournoy, The Inheritance and the Way Forward, (Washington, DC: Center for a New 
American Security, June 2007). 
35 Peter W. Singer,  “Bent but Not Broken: The Military Challenge for the Next Commander-in-Chief,” Opportunity 08: 
Independent Ideas for Our Next President (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008). 
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 Contracting & Acquisition – limiting the portfolio of new systems while also improving 
contract administration proficiency. 
The Reform Trajectory 
Considering DoD’s history, the trends from GAO’s work, and the views of the pundits, we 
mapped the areas of emphasis for defense reform that will probably confront the president in the 
first years of the next administration.  Our findings are presented on three dimensions. The first 
dimension is the functional area to be reformed. We view the four most important functional areas 
as follows:  (1) contracting & acquisition, (2) managing human resources, (3) maintaining mission 
readiness, and (4) evolving the mix of capabilities. The second dimension is the perspective of 
reform. We view the five most important perspectives as follows: (1) program effectiveness, (2) 
transparency & accountability, (3) business process improvement, (4) organizational & structural, 
and (5) financial management. The third dimension is the relative degree of emphasis, based on our 
interpretation of the data available, for each of the pairings along the first two dimensions.  These 
dimensions are portrayed in Figure 4. 
The functional area we expect will continue to receive the greatest attention is contracting 
and acquisition. GAO has stressed this area, past defense secretaries have made it a priority, it is a 
hot topic in Congress, and the candidates have made it an issue. Contracting and acquisition will be 
highly emphasized from the reform perspectives of program effectiveness, transparency and 
accountability, and business process improvement. One can expect to see another wave of 
acquisition reform initiatives to address cost growth and schedule delays. One can also expect to 
see more competition and stricter oversight. Of slightly lesser concern is the human capital 
dimension of acquisition—it is widely recognized there are insufficient numbers of government 
employees managing acquisition and overseeing contracts, and there may be concerns about the 
extant workforce’s competency in increasingly complex environments. 
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Other critical areas of reform emphasis include transparency and accountability for human 
resource management and the effectiveness of recent HR reforms. NSPS will continue to receive 
attention, and both the DoD and DHS reforms will be reconsidered in light of broader civil service 
reform. We expect attention will be paid to addressing the existing and pending competency gaps 
within the government workforce. The rising cost and policy issues surrounding the recruiting, 
training, equipping and retaining the uniformed force should continue to garner attention.  
 The next critical area is maintaining current readiness. There is widespread concern about 
the effects on readiness of the Iraq war. From resetting the force to fatigued ground forces, the next 
administration will likely pay attention to the human, materiel, and fiscal aspects of ensuring 
readiness. We also expect attention to be paid to the mix of capabilities the department should 
possess. From the congressionally mandated roles and missions review36 to the 2009 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR), the next administration will question what DoD ought to be able to do. 
From a reform perspective, the three areas that will likely be emphasized are program 
effectiveness, transparency and accountability, and process improvement. Current efforts to 
measure program outcomes and results will likely continue. This focus is a trend common across all 
levels of government and pressure will continue for DoD to do the same. Both presidential 
candidates have campaigned on pledges to increase transparency and accountability. One should 
expect to see more information made public on results and the underlying processes of 
government. While the next administration will likely replace specific programs closely associated 
                                                             
36 Section 941 of the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181) requires the Secretary of 
Defense to “conduct a comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions of the armed forces and the core 
competencies and capabilities of the Department of Defense to perform and support such roles and missions.” 
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with the present administration with their own initiatives, the spirit behind those reforms will 
probably remain—more efficient and reliable processes. Historically, there has been a tendency for 
new administrations to employ the tools of the organizational and structural perspective 
(especially changing the organizational chart) and one can expect that practice to continue. 
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Section 4: Perspectives on Business Transformation  
In this section, we narrow the perspectives about business transformation to those that are 
more directly relevant to BTA and the upcoming presidential transition. These perspectives were 
derived from interviews with representatives from OSD, the military services, and COCOMs, who 
provided an important view from the inside of the enterprise. Additionally, we reviewed the two 
presidential candidates’ perspectives, as gleaned from campaign information, the popular press, 
political pundits, and other political sources. After deriving key topics of interest from our 
interviews, we assessed the candidates’ perspectives along those same topics. Although the 
candidates do not always talk about business transformation specifically, we infer and map their 
views to the topics more generally, which provides some evidence for their attitudes toward areas 
of business transformation should they be elected.  
The topics that we focus on in this section include the definitions of business 
transformation, the key outcomes and activities of effective transformation, the barriers and 
tensions that exist in executing business transformation, and strengths and weaknesses of the BTA 
as perceived by DoD insiders. Taken together, this section outlines the perceptual landscape within 
DoD, both in its current and potential future states, depending on the outcome of the election. This 
perceptual landscape provides an initial basis from which BTA can approach the upcoming 
transition.  
What is business transformation?  
We began our interviews of OSD and the military services with a simple question: What does 
business transformation mean to you? The term “transformation” has many potential meanings and 
connotations, and we were interested in how participants in our area of focus conceived of the 
term. What resulted from this line of inquiry was an articulation of key definitions of good business 
transformation. Then, we looked carefully at the candidates’ views to try to understand how they 
might respond to those definitions suggested by our interviewees. Both sets of views provide a way 
to understand the various audiences and constituents of BTA’s efforts, which can inform 
communication priorities, transformation activities and emphasis, and other potential 
organizational adjustments.  
Generally, our interview participants saw business transformation in three ways: as a 
fundamental change in business operations, as continual process improvement, and, to a much 
lesser degree, as modernizing business systems.  
Definition: “Fundamental” change  
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective  
 Many participants were careful to point out that business transformation is not merely 
systems upgrades, but rather entails a “fundamental” examination of the business models, systems, 
processes, and personnel. One person noted that “transformation means changing fundamentally 
how you go about the business of the department,” and another called transformation the “tipping 
point where processes are changed.”   The term “fundamental” was used repeatedly, and 
participants seemed to want to emphasize that to transform a business, one needs to look at the 
very foundation—and all the included components—of the business as a whole. In the words of one 
respondent, transformation was described as “fundamental changes in how we do business, and 
this includes systems, people, process—not one of them, but all three.” Additionally, those who 
stressed that business transformation requires a fundamental reexamination often drew a 
distinction between those who might simply take a system upgrade approach: “It’s not about 
systems, though that’s part of it.  It’s how we do business, how we transform business, and whether 
we can take advantage of capabilities about how we transform and do business in future.”  While 
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there was some disagreement about what should come first—system change or process change—
there was general agreement that true business transformation needs to look at both, as well as 
those issues affected by both (e.g., culture and personnel).  
Candidates’ Perspectives  
Both presidential candidates have staked out positions that could be viewed as fundamental 
change. Both see the DOD as entrenched in a set of beliefs and structures that have outlived their 
usefulness and suggest that some type of reform is necessary. Business and management reform is 
viewed by both candidates as a complex and challenging undertaking that cannot be successful if 
limited solely to reforming a set of business processes, adding new capabilities, or changing 
structures. The area of most pronounced common ground between candidates is the belief that 
integrated, holistic reform is necessary. The differences between them are in the details of their 
reform focus. 
 Obama has indicated that he is interested in fundamental changes, and this message 
is seen throughout his campaign messages. For example, one fundamental change that 
Obama has put forward is that we need to broaden our diplomatic efforts and ensure a 
more equitable balance between military and diplomatic capabilities.   
“We have inherited a national security structure that was developed and organized 
in the late 1940s to win the Cold War. It remains a rigid bureaucracy of government 
agencies, relying upon a restrictive and disconnected set of legal authorities. We must build 
up our special operations forces, civil affairs, information operations, and other units and 
capabilities that remain in chronic short supply; invest in foreign language training, cultural 
awareness, and human intelligence and other needed counterinsurgency and stabilization 
skill sets; and create a more robust capacity to train, equip, and advise foreign security 
forces, so that local allies are better prepared to confront mutual threats.”37   
While this Obama quote and others indicate an inclination toward broad-based 
changes, there is relatively little in his campaign that addresses specific changes in the DoD 
regarding business transformation. Nonetheless, it is likely that Obama would be open to a 
fundamental change perspective.  
 
 McCain has taken a slightly more specific stance regarding fundamental changes in 
the DoD.  The area of reform within defense that he is most vocal about is acquisition. While 
not outlining specific capabilities that should be expanded, retained, or contracted, his 
primary concern is with improving process efficiency and effectiveness.  
“We need to reform and modernize the way we defend our national security. We 
need to balance the federal budget and stop spending money on things that are not the 
business of government. None of these daunting challenges can be addressed without 
genuine and lasting reform. It is essential to our security and our continued economic 
vitality.”38   
McCain’s focus on “genuine and lasting reform” may indicate his interest in and 
openness to a message of the kind of fundamental changes that may be necessary for DoD 
business transformation.  
                                                             
37 Barack Obama, Campaign Website, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/defense/  (Accessed July 18, 
2008) 
38 John McCain, Address to the Oklahoma State Legislature on Government Reform, May 21, 2007. Remarks as 
prepared for delivery. Retrieved from: http://www.johnmccain.com/informing/news/speeches/48474414-
5864-4de8-921e-d2d51de82bdd.htm  (April 20, 2008). 
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Definition: Process improvements 
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
Beyond “fundamental” changes, some participants further articulated that process change 
was a key component of transformation. Respondents stressed some key areas of emphasis 
including how the enterprise does business, improves efficiencies, uses resources, and gets things 
done. In some cases, these participants began with a clarification of what business transformation is 
not; namely, that it is not simply about systems. One person said simply that transformation is 
about “process reengineering.” Others articulated some of the consequences of process 
improvements that were important to transformation. One respondent said that “[to transform] we 
need to look at process costs, research and development, and figure out better ways to do it,” 
another noted that “It’s about a different way of doing business where you can account for all assets 
and get best bang for buck,” and another respondent from the services said “Business 
transformation looks at the services as enterprises … and it’s about making value judgments about 
the best use of resources, the right investments in people and material to fulfill the customer order 
from an enterprise perspective, and doing so without degrading capability.”  Process improvements 
can also serve another purpose—one COCOM respondent emphasized that transformation not only 
saved money, but potentially saved lives: “It’s good if we can cut that process to make things more 
efficient and save money, but it’s also about saving seconds, which can make all the difference to the 
warfighter.”  
Candidates’ Perspectives 
Both candidates have pledged to address process reform. Obama offers some specific areas 
for process improvements, whereas McCain talks more generally about process reform. It’s 
important to realize that while presidents will typically define overall strategies, their political 
appointees will deal with the mechanics of process reforms. Clearly it will be important to pay 
attention to key appointees involved in management reform such as the  DepSecDef, CIO, CFO, 
DCMO and, in Obama’s case, the possibility of a new CTO (Chief Technology Officer—see 
Modernizing business systems, below).  
Obama in his campaign messages, he focuses on transparency, competition, and 
contract administration. In his administration, he has pledged to launch “a program of 
acquisition reform and management, which would end the common practice of no-bid 
contracting. He will end the abuse of supplemental budgets by creating a system of 
oversight for war funds as stringent as in the regular budget. He will restore the 
government’s ability to manage contracts by rebuilding our contract officer corps. He will 
order the Justice Department to prioritize prosecutions that will punish and deter fraud, 
waste and abuse.”39  This example points out that Obama will likely be supportive of a 
process focus, and contracting is one area that he has already targeted for reform.  
 
McCain often invokes the corporate sector as a model for efficient processes and 
suggests not only adopting corporate best practices, but recruiting successful corporate 
executives. When he does speak of processes, he envisions them as leaner and better 
functioning, “change government to make it smaller, less expensive, better skilled.” He 
would probably encourage the continuation of Lean Six Sigma–type reforms, particularly in 
the area of acquisition.  “Another responsibility of the federal government that cries out for 
reform is how we buy the weapons systems used by our military. We are at war. Our 
servicemen and women who risk their lives for us deserve a procurement system that is 
lean, agile and efficient not a system that is ponderous, ineffective and susceptible to 
                                                             
39 Barack Obama, Campaign Website, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/fiscal/  (July 18, 2008). 
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mismanagement and even corruption.”40  McCain is likely going to be looking for those who 
can clearly analyze and uncover process problems and fix them.  
Definition: Modernizing business systems 
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
Interestingly, few respondents stated that modernizing business systems was a key 
definition of business transformation. Instead, business system modernization was seen as an 
enabler of business transformation. Several respondents, when asked to define business 
transformation, began their responses by saying “it’s not about business systems.” However, in 
their subsequent discussion of the need for fundamental or process change, they would point out 
that technology was an important part of the overall effort. One person put it this way: “Biz 
transformation is really more about business than systems,” but systems were certainly part of the 
effort.  
One interesting finding was that sometimes modernizing systems can force, or at least 
encourage, process or fundamental changes. For example, one participant suggested that even 
though, ideally, process reengineering should precede systems development, it is sometimes 
advantageous to force process compliance through system upgrades. However, others noted that 
when system modernization precedes the necessary work of process and culture change, 
sometimes the organization will sub-optimize the new technology to support old ways of doing 
business.  
In short, while technology is seen as an important component of business transformation, it 
is not often seen as defining business transformation in any comprehensive way.  
Candidates’ Perspectives 
Both candidates have stressed the importance of having an appropriate mix of technologies 
in the DoD, and both are willing to forgo existing technologies that seem excessive, redundant, or 
obsolete. Neither stresses technology as a sole solution, but each appears to view it as integral to a 
broader, strategy-driven reform.  
Obama seems to have a broad view of the issues related to technology, which will 
likely have implications both within OSD and for the warfighter. One of his key proposals is 
for a new position, a federal Chief Technology Officer (CTO), to oversee, integrate, and 
standardize the efforts of the agency CIOs. According to Obama’s vision, “the CTO would 
oversee e-government initiatives and be charged with ensuring that all agencies have a 
modern, secure infrastructure, use best-in-class technologies and share best practices. The 
CTO also would be responsible for implementing standards to ensure technological 
interoperability of key government functions.”41  If Obama is elected, this new CTO position 
is likely to impact management reform efforts, possibly in a very positive way. Tools like the 
BEA and roles like the CMO seem to be aligned with his vision. In addition to the CTO, 
Obama is interested in operational technologies in the field, tending to favor unconventional 
capabilities that include better technologies as well as new strategies.   
 
McCain has acknowledged the role of technology in facilitating change, innovation, 
and as a solution to process problems. While certainly not a technophile, he has 
demonstrated an appreciation for what technology can do and seems to lean toward the 
adoption of best commercial practices in this area: “The United States has succeeded 
because we have been more willing to embrace and encourage change than our 
competitors. Advances in information technologies have made us better at discovery, 
                                                             
40 McCain, Address to Oklahoma State Legislature. 
 
41 Jill R. Aitoro, “Obama outlines open government agenda”, Government Executive November 20, 2007. 
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quicker to find the new idea that works.”42  His inclination to make use of commercial 
technology indicates that he will likely be responsive to an approach to business 
transformation that pulls personnel and capabilities from the corporate sector.  
                                                             
42 John McCain, Campaign Website, http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/News/Speeches/c2780187-
7ce6-4226-bf6e-f04b7a1801cd.htm  (July 29, 2008). 
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Specific outcomes of good business transformation 
Within our interviews, we also asked participants to identify the key activities and 
outcomes of effective business transformation. We identify the themes below that were repeatedly 
noted across participants and thus provide a general map of perspectives within OSD, the military 
services, and the COCOMs. The value of this map of perspectives is that it reflects key points of 
emphasis for evaluating business transformation, and it additionally provides communication 
touchstones that BTA may want to capitalize on when emphasizing its value proposition.  
Specifically, there were six outcomes that participants identified as key measures for 
assessing business transformation efforts: efficiency, effectiveness, accurate data, visibility, better 
decision-making support, and ease of use.  
Outcomes: Efficiency 
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective:  
Many participants named efficiency as an ideal outcome from business transformation. 
Often efficiency was defined as cost savings, derived through, for example, streamlining processes, 
eliminating duplication (process or system), increasing speed of transactions/deliverables, 
reducing personnel, and other forms of making efficient use of resources. For example, one 
respondent noted that good business transformation needed to result in being “more efficient in 
managing assets and not just allotments. For example, sometimes it’s cheaper to buy than to rent.”  
Another specific area participants said could be more efficient was the budget process: “Streamline 
the process of vetting and approving funds, make it a single process in a compressed timeline.” 
Participants noted that industry best practices could be good models for improving efficiency, 
although some in the services and COCOMs worried about making efficiency gains at the expense of 
“effectiveness” gains for the warfighter (see “effectiveness,” below). Notwithstanding this tension 
between efficiency and effectiveness, most participants expected good business transformation to 
result in efficiency gains; as one participant put it, good business transformation means that change 
agents  need to focus on “eliminating non-value add,” and “embracing efficiency in a resource 
constrained environment.”  
Candidates’ Perspectives 
Both candidates speak frequently about efficient government. Historically, it has been a 
popular and easy campaign issue and it has been the catalyst behind frequent management reform 
movements. While Clinton spoke explicitly about bringing back the reinventing government 
movement, neither Obama nor McCain have invoked a specific efficiency-seeking agenda. 
Interestingly, neither candidate has made the claim that the federal government is inherently 
inefficient; rather, they have portrayed efficiency gains as the byproduct of higher priority reforms. 
For example, fixing contracting abuses will yield more bang for the buck, and reforming civil service 
rules will generate more productivity.  
Obama, like most political candidates, is interested in making things more efficient. 
In addition to his focus on contracting, he looks toward streamlining the government more 
broadly:  “Obama will increase the efficiency of government programs through better use of 
technology, stronger management that demands accountability, and by leveraging the 
government’s high-volume purchasing power to get lower prices. Obama will stop funding 
wasteful, obsolete federal government programs that make no financial sense.”43 However, 
Obama is also somewhat careful to point out that he’s not targeting too many specific areas 
prior to getting into office:  “That’s part of the strategic decision-making that the next 
                                                             
43 Barack Obama, Campaign Website, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/fiscal/  (July 18, 2008). 
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president’s going to have to be involved in. It doesn’t mean, by the way, that I don’t think 
that we can’t ferret out some waste, fraud, and abuse inside the Pentagon budget … how 
we’re funding our weapons systems, and whether every one of those systems is giving us 
the best bang that we need for the buck.”44 So, while he does pay the expected lip service to 
efficiency improvements, there are some indications that he’s ready to listen to where 
efficiencies can and should be gained. He may create an opening for others within DoD to 
play a key role in highlighting particular areas of emphasis.  
 
McCain also seeks to make government more efficient. One of the areas he’s 
targeted for reform is personnel policies, and he envisions a smaller workforce of highly 
motivated, well-equipped workers. While he doesn’t articulate a specific plan to achieve 
that goal, he does value ways that will attract successful workers from the corporate sector: 
“We can use this opportunity to make sure that government pay scales allow us to attract 
the finest public servants, equip them with the newest technologies, target replacements 
judiciously, and change government to make it smaller, less expensive, better skilled, and 
more dedicated to the national interest.”45 
Like Obama, McCain is also interested in making the contractors more efficient 
through contract process reform: “Too often, contractors underbid to ‘buy into’ a market 
with little expectation of delivering on schedule and within budget. Fixed price contracts 
based on realistic cost estimates with clear, consistent requirements will ensure that the 
contractor pays for cost overruns, not the taxpayers. We must also limit sole-source 
contracting and make cost discipline a priority using market competition to keep costs 
down and innovation up.”46   
Clearly, McCain will be responsive to efficiencies gained through business 
transformation efforts. He has targeted at least two areas for reform that invite an ability to 
demonstrate how business transformation efforts have contributed to efficiency gains. 
While McCain’s style appears to be more dictatorial than collaborative, he is likely to be 
interested in and moved by hard cost savings.  
Outcome: Effectiveness 
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
Another key outcome raised by participants was effectiveness, a somewhat elusive term 
that had more than one definition. In some cases, effectiveness was defined as ensuring that 
military personnel have what they need in the field: “Effectiveness comes down to ‘are we doing the 
right thing for the warfighter?’” This concern for the warfighter led some to advocate that 
effectiveness is more important than efficiency, or, at the very least, effectiveness should not be 
sacrificed for efficiency. One COCOM respondent said that even if a policy or process exists to make 
things more efficient, “that all goes out the window in a mission environment.”  
There were other definitions of effectiveness as well. Some acknowledged the fuzziness of 
the term, but described effectiveness as the net gain after improving processes or systems. For 
example, one respondent put it this way: “Effectiveness is subtle. The real reason we’re buying the 
ERP application is because we have no ability to cost out our activities.” Another of the COCOM 
participants noted that flexibility and being “good enough” was often the most effective thing to do: 
“To get good, effective outcomes, you need to inject more flexibility and have a more adaptive 
nature, especially when you’re at war. Sometimes a 75% or even a 50% solution will be good 
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enough.” Still another participant said that the efficient option is not always the most effective 
option: “Some contractors are better at competing as a low bidder but may not give best value.  The 
lowest cost doesn’t necessarily get best product.” 
Candidates’ Perspectives 
Not surprisingly, each candidate would likely be in favor of effectiveness depending on the 
definition or the area of focus. One area in which both candidates share some common ground is 
their focus on supporting and maintaining an effective military; however, they differ how to 
accomplish that goal. In addition to their focus on the military, Obama provides examples of his 
views on effective spending policies, and McCain provides examples of emulating effective practices 
from industry, and accountability in performance management. While their focus on effectiveness is 
derived from their campaign stances, their views may be instructive for BTA.  
Obama believes that an effective military is not necessarily one that solves all the 
nation’s national security issues. Instead, he sees a greater integration of both military and 
civilian efforts as necessary for national security: “An Obama administration will build up 
the capacity of each non-Pentagon agency to deploy personnel and area experts where they 
are needed, to help move soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines out of civilian roles.”47 So, as 
one example, Obama may be sympathetic to a greater integration of BTA and the State 
Department working together on business transformation efforts in Iraq. He seeks holistic 
solutions and will likely favor collaborative or comprehensive proposals over suboptimal or 
unique ones.  
Another clue to Obama’s perspective, one that comes from his views on effective 
spending, is his belief in “pragmatism”; that is, being sure that the budget can support the 
promises being made.48 As Obama advisor Richard Danzig puts it, “In my opinion, the 
budget is unrealistic in its projection of costs and gains … it [the budget] anticipates the 
delivery of ships or the achievement of personnel goals without really paying for them fully. 
That has to be dealt with.”49 One implication here may be that Obama will view favorably 
realistic assessments of what transformative efforts can reasonably accomplish.  
 
McCain has repeatedly argued for a continued military presence in Iraq, and is 
committed to doing what is necessary to support military personnel in the field. However, 
he also notes that some of the business processes in DoD that support the warfighter, 
particularly defense acquisitions, are ineffective. While he doesn’t offer specific proposals 
for reform, he does emphasize that the system needs to be more effective generally: 
“Problems in defense acquisition are well known: undefined or poorly defined and ever-
changing requirements for weapons systems; long delays in delivery, cost overruns, and a 
lack of accountability for recurring failures.”50  To the extent that BTA is contributing to 
more effective processes in acquisitions, they can probably count on capturing McCain’s 
interest.  
Another key focus of McCain’s is looking to industry for examples of effectiveness, 
models that he will likely want to emulate and adapt for DoD. For example, he praised the 
role of corporate business in Katrina: “America has many of the best run businesses in the 
world. Wal-Mart responded more quickly to the victims of Katrina than did the federal 
government. We need to ensure that FEMA adapts similar technology and processes that 
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are employed by America’s best run companies.”51  One aspect of his business mindset is his 
interest in accountability:  “Every federal agency is going to have goals set at the beginning 
of the fiscal year, and they’ll have to issue public progress reports at the end of the year on 
how well or poorly they met them … performance will determine whether they are funded 
the next year.”52 BTA’s focus on bridging industry expertise with DoD knowledge will likely 
resonate with McCain. Additionally, however, BTA as an agency will need to convey its 
effectiveness clearly to be in keeping with McCain’s focus on accountability. This could be 
done by highlighting progress, celebrating small wins, and attaining milestones. 
Outcome: Transparency/ Visibility 
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
Many participants stressed that for business to run efficiently, it is imperative that data—
particularly but not exclusively financial data—be transparent and visible. One respondent stressed 
that visibility was critical for ensuring common data definitions across components and 
organizations within DoD: “[differing definitions of data] drives me nuts. We need to be on same 
sheet with underlying data … I don’t want them to define costs differently.  It’s only possible when 
there is visibility. So long as data is seen only within specific silos, there is no way to get the 
desirable outcomes.” Another noted the importance of using visibility to cut through the “tribal 
mentality” inherent in the DoD: “Without visibility, hoarding happens … managing financial 
resources in a transparent, single data base can eliminate a tribal mentality.” One of the desirable 
outcomes noted repeatedly was a clean audit, a goal which many believed was impossible without 
visibility and transparency of data: To truly transform, “we need visibility, fiduciary responsibility, 
and auditability,” and “we need to share information so we can have a high level, clean audit.”  
Candidates’ Perspectives 
 Obama and McCain have both stressed transparency as a virtue of government. In some 
cases, they invoke this sentiment in the context of policy deliberations, terrorist detainees, or no-
bid contracting practices; however, what is common among them all is a call for open and 
deliberative processes, along with the accountability that comes from visible information. One 
should expect such thinking to permeate the department regardless of who wins, and also expect 
that openness, sharing, and visibility will be valued by both candidates.   
Obama has pledged to have a more transparent administration than either Bush or 
Clinton, both of whom he criticizes for invoking too much secrecy under executive privilege: 
“Finally,” Obama said, “we will return government to the people by bringing government to 
the people—by making it open and transparent so that anyone can see that our business is 
the people’s business. As Justice Louis Brandeis once said, sunlight is the greatest 
disinfectant. The more people know about how federal laws, rules and regulations are 
made, and who’s making them, the less likely it is that critical decisions will be hijacked by 
lobbyists and special interests.”53   Even beyond eliminating secrecy, Obama will push to 
make as much information publicly available as possible: “We will make sure every single 
tax break and earmark is available to every American online. This builds on the ‘Google for 
Government’ law I passed in Congress, which already allows you to see every contract, 
every grant, every dime of federal spending online.”54  Obama will likely be very interested 
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in efforts that move toward making the business of government more transparent, both 
within DoD and to outside constituents.  
 
McCain has also pledged to have a more transparent administration, offering 
solutions similar to Obama’s: “Information on every step of contracts and grants will be 
posted on the internet in plain and simple English. We’re not going to hide anything behind 
accounting tricks and bureaucratic doubletalk that a linguist with a PhD in accounting 
couldn’t decipher.”55 However, the strong tone of the statements indicates his 
administration may become impatient with reforms that have lengthy schedules. In 
particular, the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) efforts address the fact 
the DoD is not compliant with the CFO Act some 18 years after it was enacted, and DoD 
cannot say definitively when it will be compliant. Short term, measurable goals may work 
better in a McCain administration.  
McCain also ties his interest in accountability to the need for transparency and 
visibility, seeing them as the basis of reform efforts: “Accountability and transparency are 
the pillars of essential reform.”56  McCain underscores his commitment to transparency by 
his pledge to provide strong oversight:  “In my administration, public disclosure will be 
constant, timely and widely available. Ethical standards will be subject to frequent review. 
Every inspector general in every department of government will have direct access to the 
heads of their departments and cabinet secretaries. And I’ll hold those senior officeholders 
directly responsible for taking the necessary corrective measures to ensure the integrity of 
the departments they lead.”57 Transparency and accountability are cornerstones of McCain’s 
campaign, and he, like Obama, will likely be responsive to measures within business 
transformation that are consistent with his goals.     
Outcome: The ability to make better decisions  
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
Visibility and transparency of data is not only important for accountability reasons, 
participants also asserted that it can facilitate better decisions. Specifically, good and transparent 
data enables easier comparisons so that decision makers can choose options wisely. Importantly, 
making good decisions relies on having quality data. As one respondent put it, “We make the best 
decisions with the information we have, but we don’t always have the best information, so we don’t 
always make the best decisions.” Some participants repeatedly noted, especially those who were 
analysts or financial managers, that accurate and high quality data is critical for business 
transformation. For example, one respondent said, “We have to have authoritative sources of data. 
When I say ‘cost,’ we all have to be saying the same thing. I’m a statistician and I believe that data is 
our problem … people can have whiz bang thing, but if the data is lousy it doesn’t matter.”  Other 
respondents emphasized that the data from enterprise systems needs to be useful and meaningful: 
“we need authoritative data, and it has to be useful information … Are the cost estimates good? 
Does the data answer the questions?” Once the data are good, then you have the basis for good 
decisions: “If you can’t compare across with similar data, you can’t make decisions.”  Another 
participant summed it up this way: “Once you have standard data and processes, then the systems 
can pull it, and then we can create spreadsheets and other tools” for sharing data for making 
decisions.  
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Candidates’ Perspectives 
Both candidates provide some insights about their decision-making processes. Each has 
made transparency and visibility a hallmark of their campaigns. Additionally, each candidate seeks 
to make evidence-based decisions, but they differ somewhat in how to obtain that information. 
Obama seeks a collaborative approach to information gathering and McCain appears to be more 
directive and specific about what counts as good data. 
Obama pledged to emphasize science and evidence when making key decisions in 
his administration. He criticizes the Bush administration for making policies without such 
insights:  “The oil companies were allowed to craft energy policy with Dick Cheney in secret 
while every other voice was silenced, including the NASA scientists who tried to warn us 
about the dangers of climate change.”58  
Obama sees good decision-making as a critical attribute for the commander in chief, 
noting that the next president needs to have an “ability to see what America’s challenges 
are, to be able to see around the corner and anticipate where threats may come from in the 
future.”59 To make these decisions, he stresses the importance of a collaborative and open 
process to ensure that he has all the available, necessary input and information to make 
such decisions. Not only is he looking to put vast amounts of government information online 
for public comment and input, he also appears to exhibit a collaborative approach as a 
manager. Speaking about how Obama makes decisions with his staff on the campaign trail, 
one article described him this way: “The candidate reads widely and encourages alternative 
views in policy-making discussions.”60 Additionally, the press has often reported on his 
grassroots style of campaigning, and his belief in listening to many views. His penchant for 
collaboration, combined with his renewed commitment to seek out information and 
evidence, suggests that he will likely be very responsive to transformation efforts that 
provide wider access to better data for decision making.  
 
McCain is also interested in basing decisions on clear evidence, but he seems to be 
less collaborative and more directive. As a longtime supporter of Bush’s President’s 
Management Agenda, he sees much value in performance metrics and measures. He intends 
to use performance results to drive policy decisions and make tough calls about program 
continuation: “We’ll find some good performers, and I’ll be proud to recognize them. But 
when we do not, performance will determine whether they are funded the next year. If 
programs have a good record, and serve a purpose that the private sector can’t, they will 
receive continued funding. If they’re not giving Americans good value for their tax dollars, 
they’re going to have to change or they’re going out of business.”61  
His views on making decisions based on performance and accountability may also 
stem from his time in Congress.  As a legislator, 62 he is more sensitive to constituents’ views 
than a former governor might be, such as Clinton or Bush. This sensitivity may continue 
should McCain get into office, and a Federal Times editorial noted that longtime legislators 
like McCain “want to know the impact of federal agencies and programs on their 
constituents, and this could lead to a presidency where a nation of constituents becomes a 
priority in how agencies are managed. Such a focus might also unite the Executive and 
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Legislative branches with a more common focus on how government is run.” 63 If McCain 
takes office, it is likely that he will be concerned not only with using valid data to make 
decisions, but also with ensuring that the value of transformative efforts is clearly serving 
the American people. This may prove challenging, in some cases, for initiatives and 
programs whose value is not immediate or short term.  
Outcome: Ease of Use  
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
Many participants noted the importance of business transformation leading to systems and 
processes that are easier for users to use and manage. In short, participants generally agreed that a 
good outcome for business transformation were systems that were “easy on the user.”  Participants 
contrasted the ideal ease of use outcome with the current challenges they experience; for example, 
sometimes manual reconciliations are necessary because the system doesn’t perform a particular 
function correctly: “We need to replace manual reconciliations with elegantly simple answers 
rather than something wired together, a kludge … we need to create more workability in the 
system.”  One potential solution that respondents offered was a call for more user interaction in 
development: “understand users’ desired outcomes and use those for testing the business 
capability of the system.”  
Candidates’ Perspectives 
 Technology ease of use is a topic far too narrow for either candidate to be addressing at this 
stage, if ever. However, given their perspectives on technology, and their interest using technology 
to solve some of DoD’s challenges, ease of use is likely to be an issue that comes up, if not at the 
candidates’ level, certainly at the lower levels of the new administration’s organization. 
Additionally, to the degree that perceptions about the effectiveness of new technology are a 
reflection the effectiveness of BTA itself, BTA could use this as a way to increase their value 
proposition as an organization.  
 
Outcomes: Key Recommendations 
Efficiency 
 Emphasize efficiencies gained: Efficiency gains remain an important focus. BTA should strive 
to articulate specific, measurable, and understandable efficiency gains, and communicate 
those gains widely throughout the enterprise.  
 Balance efficiency with effectiveness: While efficiencies are often the target of transformation 
efforts, it is clear from our data that BTA should also strive for highlighting the effectiveness 
of business transformation, particularly as related to the warfighter.  
 
Effectiveness  
 Use multiple measures of effectiveness and be realistic: Clearly, there are multiple ways to 
measure effectiveness. Regardless, we recommend that BTA provide additional focus on 
effectiveness, and draw distinctions between effectiveness and efficiency measures. 
Additionally, the data suggest that realistic assessments of effectiveness will likely improve 
BTA credibility within DoD and with both candidates.  
 Tailor messages about effectiveness to specific audiences:  Different audiences are attuned to 
different measures of effectiveness, and conveying all measures to all audiences may not be 
effective. Instead, BTA should target communication to specific audiences, emphasizing 
particular effectiveness measures that pertain to those audiences.  
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Transparency  
 Make data accessible, usable, and standardized: The data suggest that participants view 
transparency and visibility of data as critical for effective business transformation. BTA 
should continue their focus on transparency and put greater emphasis on this outcome in 
their communication and outreach.  
 Be prepared to share more data publicly: Not only did DoD participants emphasize the 
importance of transparency, but the candidates have both declared their intentions to make 
government information more accessible to the general public. An increased focus on 
transparency will demonstrate BTA’s alignment with this goal and their readiness to 
implement new directives.  
Decision-making 
 Connect BTA activities to improved decision making. Both DoD participants and the 
candidates are attuned to solid data as the basis for good decisions. Concurrent with the 
increased focus on transparency of data, we recommend that BTA emphasize how their 
efforts result in better, more objective decisions.  
Ease of Use 
 Research/design applications to meet user needs and processes. Given the difficulty of 
introducing technological changes in DoD, we recommend that BTA increase their focus on 
ease of use through more user input. Not only will this focus result in more usable systems 
(e.g., the latest tool for the BEA), but will also create a more customer-centric attitude.  
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Barriers to business transformation  
Throughout our interviews, there were several challenges raised that emerged as barriers to good 
business transformation. It is important to note that these barriers will often exist regardless of whom the 
change agents are or the nature of the transformation itself. As such, these issues should be acknowledged 
and addressed as part of BTA’s overall assessment of the transformation environment. In some cases, these 
barriers—many of which are widely recognized in the research literature on organizational change  —can 
be leveraged in a couple of ways. First, specific knowledge that the barriers exist, based on empirical data 
gathered from interviews in your organization, demonstrates awareness of the challenges. Second, these 
identified barriers provide particular points of intervention for making changes and adjustments, 
depending on the severity of the problem, the level of interest that the problem is generating, the political 
circumstances at any given time, or other factors. Third, because these issues are often acknowledged and 
researched in the academic and practitioner literature, they can be used strategically in persuasive 
situations when BTA (or any change agent) is making a case for its value to the organization. This last point 
is perhaps particularly important. These barriers do not provide excuses so much as they can provide a 
means of talking about the context that often exists in any change environment. A particularly powerful 
message in response to any of these barriers is to combine visible efforts to address them along with an 
assertion that they simply exist as part of the context in many change environments, DoD or otherwise.   
From our interviews, we identified five primary barriers: the difficulty of cultural/institutional 
change, the lack of preparation in the workforce for change, the tendency toward turf protection, 
challenges with leadership, and unrealistic expectations of the change agent. Similar to our report of 
candidates’ perspectives in the previous section, Obama and McCain don’t always talk about business 
transformation specifically. However, they do address other, related issues, from which we infer what their 
possible attitudes might be to business transformation efforts.  
Barrier: Cultural/Institutional change is difficult 
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
 Participants readily recognize the difficulty of managing any changes in an organization, and 
particularly in a bureaucracy. Partly what makes change difficult is that it requires different thinking as 
well as different actions: “Business transformation is not easy—it requires that we change the way we 
think, not just how we do things differently.” To complicate matters, in the case of DoD, any change effort 
must deal with not one but (at least) three major entities: military services, OSD, and federal agencies. As 
one respondent stressed, “We are a layered, bureaucratic organization with 4 services and 29 agencies, 
with both military and civilians, operating in a complex process that is very difficult to get our hands 
around.”  Within this complex structure, there is the challenge of cultural differences that exist between 
military and civilian personnel. One services participant admitted, “[My service] is very tribal and we don’t 
view ourselves as enterprise.” Given this tribal, stove-piped culture, it is clearly challenging to move 
towards a more standardized, enterprise way of doing business. Given the particular difficulty of tribalism 
and other organizational resistance, some participants lamented the lack of focus on cultural challenges: 
“The systems are discussed, but new cultural changes are not talked about, or, when they are talked about, 
people are cavalier about them.” The complexity of DoD, and the rigidity of bureaucracies in general, make 
change efforts difficult. Nonetheless, some changes can happen, participants said, even if one can’t change 
everything: “You can’t change the whole culture … [but] it’s important to recognize what can and can’t 
change.” 
Candidates’ Perspectives 
Both candidates readily admit that government reform is difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, both 
candidates, to some degree, are running on a change platform. Their approaches to change differ, however, 
and these differences may be instructive. Interestingly, both Obama and McCain campaign advisors, Kori 
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Schake and Richard Danzig respectively, were quoted as suggesting a little conflict may be a good thing to 
bring about change in DoD: “Schake and Danzig agreed there is a need to create a disputatious atmosphere 
in DoD and national security discussions. Finding ways to unlock the wisdom of the group in the services 
will be a challenging, step-by-step process, Danzig added.”64  Additional perspectives about each candidate 
shed further light on how they might approach cultural change.   
Obama is a consensus builder who pledges to be open to the multiple competing values that 
confront most change issues. He also acknowledges that there are barriers to change that are based 
in attitude, aptitude, and institutions. Importantly, Obama believes that change is not about layering 
new things over existing old things, but rather is inherently a replacement of the old with the new. 
This view is illustrated by a metaphor used by Danzig when he talks about Obama’s views on 
change: “in Indian culture there is a goddess of destruction called Kali. This remarkable concept 
could help the Pentagon … This notion argues that it is central to the life force to have some 
powerful entity that is out there destroying things to make room for the new.” Danzig, widely 
rumored to be a possible Defense Secretary for Obama, also noted that DoD is often more willing to 
add new things than let go of the old things. In an Obama administration, the Pentagon may feel 
some pressure to move beyond what Danzig terms as its “conservative bias.”65 Obama is clearly 
committed to new ways of doing things, but he is also characterized as a consensus builder. In that 
respect, he may have sympathy for what an organization like BTA is trying to accomplish—big 
changes within a fairly rigid bureaucracy.  
 
McCain appears to take a less complicated view of change and seems less willing to 
collaborate. “I know these reforms won’t be easy. An entire bureaucracy has grown comfortable in 
its cocoon of rules and regulations and is not about to change its habits without a fight. But I don’t 
seek the presidency to do the easy things. I seek it to do the right and necessary things.”66  Even 
though he is directive and firm in his commitment to make reforms, he also acknowledges how 
difficult change can be: “Change can cause dislocation and fear,”67 he said, and he is aware that the 
benefits of changes are not always immediately apparent to those involved. Nonetheless, McCain 
repeatedly asserts that he will do what is necessary to make changes and take the heat in doing so. 
In a recent speech, he said that he has demonstrated the willingness “to make the tough calls; to 
challenge his party; to risk criticism from his supporters to bring real change to Washington.”68 
Potentially, if McCain is on board with the enterprise changes being sought, he is likely to lend 
strong support to enterprise changes.  
Barrier: Unprepared workforce 
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
Another barrier to enterprise change is that personnel may be unprepared for or lack the necessary 
skills to manage or, in some cases, make the changes required. One of the key issues, participants say, is 
that career government employees lack IT systems and enterprise management expertise but have the 
necessary domain knowledge. On the other hand, outside contractors have the required system and 
enterprise expertise, but lack the deep understanding of the organization. One participant summed up 
some of the key problems: “I question whether or not federal government can pay for robust systems 
expertise … who would work for DoD?  DoD is a step, not a career, and outside experts can fetch better 
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salaries elsewhere.  The challenge is how get people who understand [DoD] as well as the civil servants do 
because you need that functional expertise … the risk is that they can’t keep outside people who understand 
DoD.  The civil servants understand DoD, but need to rely on outsiders for system knowledge.”  Ideally both 
insiders and outsiders should collaborate and build on each set of skills, but both groups may be 
unprepared to engage in the type of collaboration necessary for true integration.  
Candidates’ Perspectives 
Both candidates believe the federal workforce is currently unprepared to deal with the major 
national security challenges and business-like challenges that face DoD now and into the near future. Both 
have stated that their appointees will be selected primarily because of competence and not political 
favoritism or ideological alignment. Both offer proposals to address deficiencies in the permanent federal 
workforce, but they are quite different in their approaches. Obama seeks to develop skills in the federal 
workforce, and McCain looks to acquire those skills from people in industry. 
Obama believes that the skills necessary to run the DoD need to be developed within the 
government workforce. In some cases, different skills can be acquired from within government by 
moving people from one agency or department to another. Obama acknowledges that government 
employees may need additional training, and he appears ready to invest in that training. He noted, 
for example, that “if we’ve got a State Department or personnel that have been trained just to be 
behind walls, and they have not been equipped to get out there alongside our military and engage, 
then we don’t have the kind of national security apparatus that is needed. That has to be planned 
for; it has to be paid for. Those personnel have to be trained … that is something that we have not 
accomplished yet, but that’s going to be what’s increasingly important in our future”69  In this 
example and others from Obama’s campaign, he acknowledges that the government workforce has 
skill deficits and is likely unprepared for future DoD challenges and requirements; however, he 
believes that these deficits can and should be dealt with through training and proper placement of 
existing (or new) government personnel. Relative to the issues in business transformation, Obama 
may be more inclined to support internal training and somewhat less sympathetic than McCain 
about drawing on outside expertise.   
 
McCain, on the other hand, recognizes that the requisite skills may exist in other workforce 
sectors, and he believes that the federal government should draw personnel and expertise from 
outside DoD. “If I’m elected President, I will say to the best people outside Washington who have 
proven their worth by setting goals and achieving them, whether it’s running a Fortune 500 
company in Silicon Valley or a smaller enterprise in America’s heartland: ‘you have done well for 
yourself and your shareholders, now come serve your country.’ I want people who know how to run 
things: efficiently, ethically, and successfully.”70  So, rather than focusing internally and developing 
new skills among existing federal workforce, he will look to the market and for-profit sector to fill 
necessary skill gaps.  “We must streamline our workforce, demand high standards of behavior, 
promote excellence at every level based on merit and accountability … Employees in the private 
sector know that if they don’t do their job right they will lose their job. Competition and 
consequences are the driving force of excellence. Taxpayers deserve the same commitment to 
excellence from their employees. There must be a new bargain with federal employees.”71  In a 
McCain administration, drawing enterprise and IT expertise from the outside will likely be 
understood, welcomed, and encouraged.  
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Barrier: Turf protection 
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
 Some participants believed that while many people recognized the need for collaboration and 
standardized ways of doing business for transformation to occur, people were not inclined to want to 
change in their own areas of responsibility; rather, the majority of the problems were felt to be in other 
components or other’s areas of responsibility besides their own. As one respondent noted, “The 
organizations [within DoD] feel that everyone else is the problem, and that they have right answers.”  
Additionally, enterprise changes mean that, to some degree, the power for making business decisions is 
centralized and thus taken from the hands of individual business owners. One participant stated, “Look, I’m 
worried about my own children first,” and another described different interests as “fiefdoms,” that were in 
“competition for authority and power.” There are differing opinions as to what kinds of power should exist 
in which parts of the enterprise, but the general barrier of power struggles remains a challenge that will be 
faced by change agents in the federal government. There is naturally an investment in the status quo, and 
business owners at all levels may have difficulty letting go of control and trusting their areas of 
responsibility to different—perhaps untested—entities within the enterprise. The key may be in 
negotiating, rather than mandating change: “You can’t have BTA instilling themselves within (a 
department) to make transformation happen; you have to have the BTA people collaborating with (the 
department).” 
Candidates’ Perspectives 
Both candidates seem aware that a significant barrier to change in government is the parochialism 
inherent in the system. An InsideDefense.com story reported, “Fostering improvements in the interagency 
process is another looming challenge of interest to both camps. The Pentagon desperately craves the 
participation of other agencies, but is also fiercely territorial.”72 Part of the challenge that both candidates 
recognize is that those in charge of various programs, bureaus, or functions are rewarded for promoting 
their own area, regardless whether they’re producing effective results or not. Turf protection is definitely 
on the radar of both camps, but Obama has emphasized it more than McCain.  
Obama’s view of government is one of interagency cooperation and will almost certainly 
extend to DoD. “I do not want to rob Peter to pay Paul because I see our joint forces as one, and I’m 
not somebody who thinks that inter-service rivalries are particularly productive.”73 Not only is 
Obama impatient with infighting, the existence of turf protection in DoD is also well acknowledged 
by his campaign. His advisors note this barrier as a particular challenge to making changes:  “Within 
DoD there are strong cultural impediments to change. It is extraordinarily hard for DoD to talk 
about what it is not going to do because participants in such discussions fight to protect their 
territory.”74  This awareness could have several implications for business transformation efforts. 
First, Obama will almost certainly acknowledge the difficulties inherent in enterprise change, and 
his commitment to stop turf protection could lead to actions that support those change efforts. 
Regardless of what he does, however, it is plausible that Obama will view turf protection as an 
existing barrier within the culture, not necessarily the failing of a particular program or change 
agent. Accordingly, he may be very welcoming of change agents who strive to break down these turf 
battles. 
 
McCain is well-known for his opposition to pork barrel spending, a clear form of turf 
protection, albeit from a congressional perspective. “Year after year, powerful members of Congress 
divert taxpayer dollars to special interest pet projects with little or no national value. This practice 
is especially egregious during wartime, when any federal spending wasted on parochial programs 
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to satisfy special interests represents a failure by the federal government to properly steward tax 
dollars.”75 When he addresses defense acquisition, he expresses outrage when local goals affect 
global ones: “Why has a broken system endured for so long? It is the product of members of 
Congress who are more concerned with their re-election than national security; bureaucrats who 
place individual and parochial service priorities above national defense priorities, and defense 
contractors more concerned with winning the next contract than performing on the current one. If 
I’m elected President, I intend do something about that.” One would expect that his administration 
would be just as intolerant of parochialism that sub-optimizes or interferes with broad business 
reform goals. So, to the extent that BTA works toward mitigating or breaking down turf battles, they 
should expect some support for those actions from a McCain administration.  
Barrier: Leadership turnover and misalignment 
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
There were several general leadership challenges identified as potential barriers to business 
transformation. One challenge particular to DoD was the constant turnover of leaders, both military officers 
and civilian political appointees. One participant, looking toward the presidential transition, said simply: “It 
doesn’t matter if it’s a Democrat or a Republican, each starts over and throws out good work.” Even within 
the same administration, the turnover in the Pentagon, both military and civilian, was noted as a barrier to 
making enterprise changes. One participant noted the “revolving door of political appointees,” and another 
lamented the challenges with “flag rank officers rotating every two years.”   
Another challenge beyond turnover is that different leaders, at different levels of the organization, 
are committed to different priorities.  The reasons for differing levels of commitment are varied, but one 
identified by several participants was that some leaders (perhaps understandably) are focused on short 
term problems rather than the longer term issues that characterize enterprise changes. Additionally, 
leaders in DoD have been traditionally tasked with understanding the combat environment rather than the 
business environment and therefore may not understand the relationships between business problems, 
processes, and systems.  
Candidates’ Perspectives 
Neither candidate directly addresses the challenge of rotating leadership in DoD. However, both 
candidates seem to understand that there must be alignment in vision throughout the chain of command to 
succeed in making meaningful and lasting reform. There are a couple of focus areas that each candidate has 
talked about specifically; the need for credibility at the top of the organization, the importance of clarity, 
strategy, and vision, and the need to select the right people to fill the right roles.  
Obama, in order to ensure leadership and organizational alignment, has been more vocal 
about the need for credibility at the top of the organization, likely because he has never been in the 
military: “because I have not served in uniform, I am somebody who strongly believes that I have to 
earn the trust of the men and women in uniform.”  While many candidates believe an election 
victory gives them a mandate, Obama seems to understand that is not enough: “Just because you’ve 
gotten elected doesn’t mean that everybody’s going to fall in lock-step immediately. I think that you 
always have to perform a little bit before people say, ‘You know, this is a guy who I can follow.’”76 
This commitment to earning respect is evident within his campaign, and Obama recognizes the 
need for a solid relationship between political appointees and uniformed leadership.  Danzig, 
Obama’s advisor, noted that where Donald Rumsfeld alienated the Pentagon, Robert Gates has been 
successful in moving things back to a more “consultative organization.” Danzig asserts that “an 
Obama administration would go even further” in that direction.77 Obama’s sensitivity to 
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collaboration and earning the respect of the military may make him more open to actively 
managing the misalignment challenges.  
 
McCain also recognizes the leadership misalignment that occurs within DoD, but is much 
less patient and more critical of those who perpetuate it, from Congressmen to bureaucrats. His 
perspective on leadership misalignment can be seen in this quote that also illustrated his view on 
turf protection, and it’s likely he sees a connection between the two: “Why has a broken system 
endured for so long when everyone’s well aware of the problem? It is the product of members of 
Congress who are more concerned with their re-election than national security; bureaucrats who 
place individual and parochial service priorities above national defense priorities, and defense 
contractors more concerned with winning the next contract than performing on the current one.”78  
While McCain doesn’t address the challenges of legitimate differences that may exist between, for 
example, political appointees and military leaders, he is clearly unsympathetic to those who need to 
be held accountable for wrong action. Richard Armitage, another advisor to McCain and one 
mentioned as a possible Secretary of Defense if McCain is elected, praised Secretary Gates’ recent 
firing of Air Force leadership, widely rumored to be less about the nuclear weapons incident and 
more about the lack of alignment with Gates’ vision for the Air Force. If Armitage were Secretary of 
Defense, he says he would continue what Gates started: “It’s about time we got accountability 
across government particularly in the Pentagon.”79 If McCain is elected, he is likely going to look for 
allegiance to his vision; to the extent that business transformation efforts are aligned with McCain’s 
priorities, they stand a better chance of being supported.   
Barrier: Unrealistic expectations 
OSD/Services/COCOM Perspective 
  One final barrier to business transformation is that the larger organization may have expectations 
of the change agents that are potentially unrealistic, given the complexities in any change environment. 
Unrealistic expectations may, in some cases, be the result of DoD constituencies overlooking small wins 
and, perhaps unfairly, criticizing the absence of big wins. One participant explained that the need to 
recognize “small victories” within transformation efforts is critical because the large victories are longer 
term and more subtle. Even so, the degree and complexity of the changes DoD is undergoing may make 
short term measures of success difficult. To complicate matters further, other participants noted that 
measuring successes prematurely, in order to comply with short term demands of success, may lead to 
measures that lack credibility or don’t adequately demonstrate the gains being sought.  
Another challenge for the change agents is that they are reliant, to a large extent, upon the 
cooperation and collaboration of others in the enterprise to implement new ways of thinking and doing 
business. In some cases, participants noted ambiguities in roles, responsibilities, and power as impeding 
cooperation. Other respondents noted that the turf battles over power and control are real and that it may 
be unrealistic to expect the change agent overcome resistance without additional authority or levers for 
influence. However, if some central authority exists to mandate certain changes, BTA can more clearly 
define its role as consultant, executor of policy, and negotiator between business areas.  
Candidates’ perspective 
Both candidates have called themselves pragmatic. While they possess different leadership styles 
and different policy preferences, both candidates seem to be realistic about the difficulty of creating 
change. However, Obama believes the route to overcoming those difficulties lies in working within the 
system, whereas McCain believes that we need to look outside; in McCain’s view, we can’t expect much 
from government, so we need to seek remedies elsewhere.   
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Obama asserts that he has a realistic view of how changes happen, and he’s sensitive about 
promising too much: “So look, I want to be honest, we are going to be in a tight budget situation. 
We’re not going to be able to do everything all at once … I’m mindful that there are going to be some 
constraints. I don’t want to over-promise, because there’s nothing worse than a politician who 
promises everything and then doesn’t deliver anything.”80 This quote, which is consistent with 
other illustrations of his perspective, indicates that Obama recognizes that there is no silver bullet 
for bringing about change. One possible implication his views have for business transformation 
efforts is that Obama may be sympathetic to the constraints that may impact the ability to 
demonstrate immediate results.   
 
 McCain also expresses a need for change, but he takes a no-nonsense approach that 
emphasizes the limitations of government: “I am a conservative, and I believe it is a healthy thing 
for Americans to be skeptical about the purposes and practices of public officials, and refrain from 
expecting too much from government.”81 His approach, illustrated by the slogan on his campaign 
bus as the “straight talk express,” reflects his results-oriented perspective. For example, when he 
talked about problems in defense acquisition, he emphasized the importance of accountability: “We 
must set clear expectations and requirements at the outset of an acquisition program, and stick to 
the plan throughout the life of the program. But we must be prepared to make tough decisions 
when a product does not meet the demands of the market. We must be willing to pull the plug 
before sinking more dollars into weapons that do not provide what our warriors need for the 
conflicts of today and tomorrow.” 82 Notwithstanding McCain’s nod toward the difficulty of change, 
he may be less sympathetic to claims that expectations are unrealistic. Perhaps a better approach 
with McCain will be to create lower expectations that are achievable.  
Barriers: Key Recommendations 
Difficulty of change 
 Integrate the technical and social-cultural aspects of change. While BTA plays a clear role in the 
technical aspect of change, participants see a lack of attention being paid to the cultural issues. We 
recommend that BTA address the cultural change issues more directly in their work in the 
enterprise.  
 Be prepared for a shift to a more facilitative role as a change agent: Regardless of which candidate is 
elected, there will be an opportunity to align with and assist in both candidates’ change agendas. 
We recommend that BTA be prepared for and capitalize on their role as a change agent, which 
should include both a cultural and technological/systems focus.  
Unprepared Workforce 
 Provide DoD/BTA workforce development and training: BTA is currently providing opportunities for 
technical and systems training for DoD staff. We recommend that BTA continue those training 
opportunities and perhaps expand the offerings to address additional needs of the enterprise. 
Additionally, BTA should train its own contract and organic staff in how DoD functions. Finally, BTA 
should champion change management and collaboration training and awareness throughout the 
enterprise, both in its own staff and in the various business areas in DoD.  
 Evaluate the balance of contract and organic staff: It is relatively well known that enterprise change 
demands several skill sets, but each candidate has a different perspective on the right balance 
between contract and organic staff. At this point, we recommend that BTA evaluate the mix of staff 
and be prepared to justify and/or readjust the workforce balance of the agency.  
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Turf Protection 
 Come from a position of negotiating (not mandating) implementation: Parochialism and turf 
protection are long-time problems in DoD. The data suggest that BTA, as an agency, may more 
effectively manage this barrier by negotiating rather than mandating change. We recommend that 
BTA adopt a negotiative stance at all levels of the BTA organization.  
 Focus on common goals first to build trust: Because resistance to change is high, BTA must develop 
trust with its various constituencies. To build that trust, we recommend that BTA personnel seek 
common ground as the starting place for change, even if the changes that result fall short of BTA’s 
ideal.  
 Emphasize turf mediation efforts to align with candidates: Both candidates are committed to 
eliminating parochialism and mitigating various conflicts. We recommend that BTA increase its 
emphasis as a negotiator within turf battles, and stress those actions as part of the value you 
provide.  
Leadership challenges  
 Position BTA as a stabilizing agent of the new reform agenda: Leadership turnover and misalignment 
is a key barrier that is particularly evident in DoD. We recommend that BTA position itself as a 
consistent, stable force amidst the reality of leadership changes. Not only can they perform the 
much needed role as a stabilizing agent for DoD transformation efforts, they can demonstrate their 
commitment to aligning the enterprise to the administration’s vision.  
Unrealistic expectations 
 Clarify, simplify, and communicate the mission of BTA: There are potentially unrealistic expectations 
of BTA which may stem from confusion over what, specifically, BTA is responsible for. We 
recommend that BTA carefully review and clarify its mission, ensure that it is achievable, and then 
communicate that mission broadly within the enterprise.  
 Tie quick, high value wins to long term goals: To further emphasize those areas of focus that BTA has 
identified as part of its core mission, we recommend that they not only emphasize and broadcast 
short term wins, but also tie those wins to longer term goals. This move illustrates the value of 
current activities while also demonstrating the contribution to broader objectives.  
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Tensions  
 The perspectives we gleaned from our interviews gave rise to several tensions that exist 
related to business transformation in general, and BTA in particular. By “tensions” we refer to areas 
in which some participants advocated one course of action, and others advocated a different course 
of action. These tensions are not merely areas of dispute, but rather represent issues that may call 
for a both/and approach rather than an either/or approach. As such, we provide some guidance and 
suggestions but not specific recommendations related to the tensions we observed. Rather, we 
present them as tensions that any change agent needs to understand to be effective. There were 
three primary tensions of note: centralized vs. decentralized power and authority, strategic vs. 
tactical approaches, and insider vs. outsider expertise.   
Tension: Centralized vs. decentralized power and authority 
 As we noted earlier, one of the criticisms of BTA was that change needed to be driven from 
the core business owners rather than BTA. However, the issue of who should have power to 
mandate changes is a complicated one. At its most basic, this tension is between centralized or 
decentralized authority.  
Those that made the case for centralized authority argued that a central authority was 
essential to change ingrained behaviors. For example, one participant said that “you need authority 
to challenge the status quo,” and another said “I’m all for consensus, and consensus is good, but 
sometimes you need an authoritative approach, especially when lives are at stake or people can 
die.” Generally those who advocated a centralized approach believed that OSD or DoD should take 
control. One person asserted that “DoD should mandate interoperability,” and another said “make 
OSD responsible for corporate systems.” In addition to arguing for central authority, those who took 
the centralized approach were skeptical that decentralized authority was necessary or a good idea: 
“Organizations want to have ownership, by stovepipes. They believe they are experts about what is 
needed, but they’re not.” Another criticized those who stood behind Title 10 as providing the 
authority to manage their own enterprise business decisions: “Title 10, which is what services fall 
back on, is baloney. If you take a look at services, they selectively hand off Title 10 responsibilities 
and outsource them to industry.”    
On the other hand, many participants argued for decentralized authority and the ability for 
components and organizations to manage their own business decisions. They stressed that a 
centralized authority didn’t have enough understanding of the individual business missions to 
mandate specific changes: “You have guys making decisions who are not qualified … [for example], 
having a guy from business is helpful from a business perspective, but he doesn’t understand what 
the acquisition guys need.”  Instead, those who held the decentralized view argued that 
“organizations should provide strategic oversight and have authority over main business mission.” 
While the arguments for decentralized authority primarily came from the components and core 
business owners, there were also OSD participants who advocated for this position: “People should 
have authority and responsibility to make decisions about IT systems, with auditors to check them, 
without me and Washington looking down their throats. I can ask questions, but don’t put me in 
charge of building ships.”  
Both sides of this argument may have valid points. From BTA’s perspective, however, it is 
important to note that this tension exists and, as an agency, operates right in the middle between 
these two perspectives. It may be that BTA can operate best as an agent of another central 
authority, working closely with core business owners through collaboration and consultation, to 
implement enterprise changes. Even if BTA had the explicit authority to mandate changes, 
organizational research and industry experience demonstrates that resistance to such changes 
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would likely persist; therefore, an increased focus on collaboration may aid BTA in building trust, 
credibility, and ultimately better compliance. 
Tension: Strategic vs. tactical approaches  
 There was some disagreement about whether BTA should play a strategic or a tactical role 
in business transformation. However, upon closer examination of the data, this issue arose as a 
tension because it related more to the need for strategic and tactical approaches, regardless of who 
was playing which roles.  
 Some argued that BTA, specifically, should be more strategic. As one respondent said, “BTA 
is just the group that deals with systems,” and they are “primarily focused on scorecard outcomes” 
but “it’s important to look long term and predict the future.” However, even though BTA was named 
specifically in a few instances, participants who advocated for a strategic view placed the 
responsibility more broadly than the agency. For example, one respondent said, “The Secretary 
[SecDef] should be like a tiger team and look ahead.  We spend too much money on the tail, not the 
tooth.” For some, BTA embodied this overly tactical focus, but many acknowledged that BTA itself 
shouldn’t necessarily be setting enterprise strategy. Regardless, the lack of a more strategic focus 
caused problems: “One of our biggest problems is that multiple competing enterprises are throwing 
money, resources, and time to develop asynchronous solutions.”    
 Most participants, however, argued that BTA was better positioned to be a tactical 
execution arm for larger enterprise strategy that was set by OSD. As one person put it, BTA “should 
stay flat, be focused on execution, and not concerned with traditional policy.”  One respondent 
noted the importance of the unique roles of BTA and OSD: “OSD is like a holding company, so they 
don’t execute well. OSD sets goals and standards … BTA is more system centric, they’re pretty good 
when they act like a consultant coming in to show business how to do better. When BTA ventures 
outside of systems, they do so at risk.” 
 Clearly, there is a need for both strategic and tactical approaches. It may be important for 
BTA to clearly distinguish differences between tactical and strategic efforts, articulate their place 
within these approaches, and play the role where they can be most effective.  
Tension: Outsider vs. insider expertise 
 A final tension that affects BTA is the need for both outsider and insider expertise to drive 
business transformation. Different participants stressed the need for one over the other, but it 
seems clear that both are necessary to drive enterprise change.  
 BTA represents outsider expertise. Many noted the necessity of such expertise, and the 
continued need for BTA to provide it: “You need people who know how to run the business side of 
entity, how to bring together different business areas to achieve agreement on processes that 
transcend multiple business areas.” Another participant said that BTA provided the expertise to 
“look at all the overhead functions, figure out where deficiencies are, and determine how we’re 
going to fix them.”  Without the enterprise and IT knowledge that BTA provides, enterprise change 
would be difficult, if not impossible.  
 On the other hand, participants also argued that insider expertise is also critical: “If you 
don’t understand DoD, or if you’re in conflict with DoD, you can’t be effective [at business 
transformation].” Another noted that outsiders involved in business had to understand that there 
was much to learn about the organization prior to trying to change it: “there is a learning curve to 
understanding DoD,” one participant said, “and our IT systems should conform to the organization 
and not the other way around.”  
 This tension reflects the dual need for outsider and insider knowledge, and BTA is in a 
challenging position to balance these positions. BTA, as the agency that has the enterprise change 
experience, should seek the best balance for achieving enterprise changes. Then, having staked out 
that position, BTA will need to adjust the framing of their position depending on who gets elected.  
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Strengths of BTA 
Up to this point, we have been focusing primarily on issues related to business 
transformation in general, the challenges that exist within DoD, and the candidates’ views related to 
those issues. In this subsection, we turn to the particular role that BTA plays in support of the goals, 
outcomes, and activities in good business transformation. These next subsections (strengths and 
criticisms of BTA) focus exclusively on the OSD/Service/COCOM perspectives gleaned from our 
interviews, during which we asked key DoD personnel to reflect specifically on BTA’s efforts.  
This list of strengths is obviously not exhaustive of all BTA strengths. However, based on the 
perceptions of those we interviewed, these are the strengths that readily came up, and therefore 
represent a perspective that may be important for BTA to consider as it targets messages and 
chooses the areas to highlight in creating its value proposition to those within the organization.     
Specifically, participants praised BTA for the role they play as a cross functional and 
impartial entity, an enterprise knowledge expert, a tactical and systems consultant, a manager of 
standard frameworks and systems, and a supporter of the warfighter.  
Strength: Cross-functional and impartial entity 
Many of our respondents noted the importance of having a cross functional entity, and BTA 
was praised for fulfilling that role. Prior to the stand up of BTA, participants said that there was no 
single entity looking across organizations, stovepipes, and systems to ensure that resources are 
optimized across the enterprise. As one respondent said, BTA is good at “running business side of 
entity … they can bring together different business areas to achieve agreement on processes.” 
Participants also stressed the importance of having an impartial entity: “It’s a helpful relationship 
[with BTA] for issues that are at that level where they can help … It’s good have an impartial advisor 
to weigh in or advise.” As an impartial entity, respondents also noted the importance of BTA’s role 
in identifying what one person called “mischief” in the seams between functional areas. In DoD, 
there is a tendency to focus inward on functional areas and components rather than striving for an 
enterprise perspective. BTA, respondents said, plays a key role in bringing visibility to 
redundancies, disconnects between individual entities and the enterprise, and generally forcing the 
issue of cross functional standardization and optimization. One participant summed it up this way: 
“If BTA went away, there would be no focal point for business transformation in government.” 
Strength: Enterprise knowledge expert 
In addition to their role as a cross functional entity, BTA was repeatedly noted for its 
expertise in enterprise management. Participants emphasized that prior to BTA there was no entity 
in the organization that understood how to manage an enterprise as a whole: “BTA has done a good 
job. Where the BMMP/FMMP started, there were a lot of false starts.” The ability to understand 
enterprise management is critically necessary in such a stove-piped organization. As one person 
noted, “it takes people who understand data and acquisitions. The BTA guys talk to services and 
business folks, and BTA can get info shared across the enterprise … they pull us together and share 
information. I’m less likely to do that.” Another participant said BTA was important because “no one 
else in DoD sees how all the pieces come together, and we need someone who watches the flow 
over time.” Respondents identified several specific areas of BTA enterprise expertise including 
systems, data, bridging functional expertise with enterprise support, process reengineering, 
software mapping, best practices from an enterprise perspective, and the knowledge to move from 
legacy systems to a new target environment. One respondent was particularly vocal about BTAs 
role in identifying duplicate systems: “Vendors sell their interfaces over and over again with only 
slight changes, and if you can standardize, you can reuse them throughout enterprise … the cost 
savings is then distributed across enterprise.”   
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Strength: Tactical and systems consultant 
Key to BTAs enterprise expertise is their role as a tactical and systems consultant. As an 
enterprise manager, BTA was praised (particularly the higher levels of the organization) for “rolling 
up their sleeves and doing things” for various organizations within DoD. To deliver their enterprise 
expertise, many participants stressed their belief that BTA serves best in a consulting role. One 
respondent called them a good “execution arm” and another noted that BTA included “smart people 
who do transformation … [we need] people who are thinking along those lines, day to day, about 
ways to reform.” There were numerous examples provided of how BTA served in this consultant 
role effectively by working with the core business areas and components, both on the business side 
and in the field. One participant praised the role of BTA when they stayed “system centric,” and 
acted as a “consultant who comes in to show us how to do things better.”  Many of the respondents 
who stressed the need for BTA to act as a consultant to the core business areas also said that BTA 
should act in a consulting role to the CMO/DCMO. While the CMO/DCMO should set policy and 
identify broad issues to address across the enterprise, BTA is well positioned to consult both 
upwards for policy considerations and downwards in policy execution. One person stressed that 
with the right governance, “BTA can hold people accountable … from a position of supporting” a 
broader governing entity.  
Strength: Manager of standard frameworks 
BTA was also consistently praised for introducing and managing standard frameworks (e.g., 
BEA, ERAM): “We need BTA to be a keeper of those frameworks.” While there are some criticisms of 
the frameworks themselves (see next section), most of our respondents noted the necessity of 
having those frameworks to govern enterprise changes: “To achieve enterprise integration, you 
need to have compliance with architecture … standardization is good and it helps ensure feeder 
systems work well.”  Prior to BTA, the frameworks were either underdeveloped or underenforced. 
With the stand up of BTA, the frameworks took on new emphasis, and participants noted that those 
frameworks are critical and would be in jeopardy if BTA wasn’t actively managing them: “Without 
BTA, the loss would be the BEA. Who would maintain it?”  
Strength: Support for the warfighter 
Some of the highest praise came from commanders in the field who heralded BTA as aiding 
in the global war on terror. As the national security focus turns to various forms of soft power, BTA 
is being recognized as playing a key role in Iraq and war torn economies. As a COCOM respondent 
put it, “BTA is helping to exploit lines of operation in Anbar Province. In Anbar, there’s a lot of old, 
state-owned enterprises. They’re antiquated, but [BTA] said, ‘Let’s try and get power to them, get 
people to work, give them something to ship out.’” By focusing on growing economies through by 
helping to restore power, get people back to work, upgrading banking capabilities, and other 
economic improvements, BTA is, in the words of one COCOM, “helping give them [Iraqis] a sense of 
normalcy after the war.” These efforts are seen not only as restorative for these communities, but 
also as preventative measures that may preclude and help avoid further hostilities in the region. In 
addition to business development efforts, respondents noted that BTA helps the warfighter by 
increasing efficiencies within DoD as a whole. One respondent said, “ultimately we’re here to put as 
many resources into war fighting capabilities as can … BTA helps us by using best practices, 
eliminating duplication, reducing the time taken, and reducing the number of hands it takes to get 
capabilities to the soldier, which ultimately leads to more resources being available for the 
personnel in the war effort.”  
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Strengths: Key recommendations 
Cross functional  
 Emphasize roles of mediator, impartial judge, and problem solver: BTA is recognized for its 
value in providing impartiality to solving problems and mitigating turf battles. We 
recommend that they continue to emphasize this role as mediator in managing enterprise 
changes.  
Expertise 
 Consult to DoD and share best practices and enterprise knowledge: Core business owners are 
taken up with the specific issues unique to running their area of the enterprise and thus 
unable to attend to business issues related to the enterprise as a whole. We recommend that 
BTA continue to focus on its valuable role as consultant, in which they attend to enterprise 
issues and sharing best practices.  
Standards 
 Continue to emphasize the management of the standard frameworks: While there are some 
criticisms of the BEA, participants do see the value of having standardized frameworks. We 
recommend that BTA continue to emphasize its role as manager of the BEA, ERAM, and 
others, taking care to be responsive to challenges raised by its various consumers.   
Warfighting 
 Connect to the warfighting mission where appropriate: While not all of BTA’s business 
transformation activities can or should be connected directly to the war-related mission, 
many of their constituencies do respond favorably to efforts that directly benefit the 
warfighter. We recommend that BTA, where possible, emphasize its role in supporting the 
war and peacekeeping efforts.  
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Criticisms of BTA 
While most of our respondents saw value in BTA and its focus on enterprise thinking, there 
were several criticisms to be aware of. Again, these criticisms are a reflection of perspectives—
whether fair or unfair—and to that extent they need to be managed. There are a variety of possible 
responses to these criticisms that could include doing additional research, making organizational 
changes, or adjusting communication strategies.  
Specific criticisms of BTA included charges that it is too big and inefficient, not always 
collaborative, lack change management skills, assume responsibility for business decisions that 
belong with core business owners, is too tactical and systems oriented, and is not effective at selling 
themselves and their value within DoD. Additionally, the key framework they manage—the 
Business enterprise Architecture—is seen by some as limited and problematic. 
Criticism: BTA is too big and inefficient 
Many respondents said that BTA is too big: “BTA has grown fast, and like anything that 
grows fast, it gets big, and cumbersome, and seen as wasteful. This often happens with new 
agencies.” Some were unclear what the agency did that required so many people, and one person 
said that the size of the organization invited some unwelcome scrutiny of the organization: “I’m in a 
fairly high position here, with some access to BTA on a regular basis … I don’t know who a lot of 
those people are. That’s a potential problem.”  In some cases, respondents saw a relationship 
between the size of the agency and what they viewed as inefficiency: “When you have to work with 
OSD and BTA and get through their staffs, it adds 90 days to 6 months to process.”  Respondents 
seemed to want BTA to be a role model of the efficiency that they strive for in DoD business 
processes. One of the reasons offered for their inefficiency was not only the size of the agency, but 
also the scope of its responsibilities. As one person put it, he would counsel the organization to 
“shrink BTA, pick the things they’re best at and jettison those things that were thrust upon them, 
and make it an efficient organization.  It seems unmanageable.” Additionally, several respondents 
said that BTA-related meetings were often non-productive and didn’t result in final decisions: “The 
system seems geared toward micromanagement, and we spend too much time in meetings, without 
the principals, that never result in decisions.”  The actual reasons for this non-productivity may be 
varied, but the perception was that BTA was too big and unwieldy to be as efficient as they could be 
at making changes. As one person put it, BTA needed to focus only on the major program issues: 
“[BTA should] just do the big programs and put the guys in place who can do the high level 
analysis.”   
Criticism: BTA is not always collaborative 
Although many BTA staff talked about the need for more direct control over business 
transformation efforts, many of their constituents recognized the need for a more collaborative 
approach: “You can’t have BTA instilling themselves within (a department) to make transformation 
happen; you have to have the BTA people collaborating with (the department)” Participants offered 
several examples of successful collaboration (e.g., within Iraq, the services, and the core business 
areas). However, at lower levels of the organization, many believed that BTA personnel were 
inexperienced in collaboration. One respondent said that “BTA is aloof, dictatorial, not good at 
education, and isolated from the rest of department and AT&L.”  Many who advocated a consulting 
role for BTA saw themselves as clients of the organization; however, that is not how they felt they 
were treated. Because BTA is still reliant, to a large extent, upon the cooperation and collaboration 
of others in the enterprise to implement new ways of thinking and doing business, increased 
collaboration may be critical to achieve their goals. 
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Criticism: BTA lacks change management skills  
Related to the criticism regarding collaboration is a criticism that the agency does not have 
the skills to manage change. The top level of the organization (e.g., David Fisher, Paul Kettrick, Paul 
Brinkley) does get high marks for their understanding of how to bring about transformation and 
change. “David Fisher is very credible, but there is not much depth in the organization. They have 
pretty shallow roots.” However, even though some participants acknowledged that BTA personnel 
were providing their technical skills rather than people skills, most believed that the people skills 
and a collaborative approach were critical in bringing about the changes being sought. As one 
person put it, “there needs to be a tone of ‘we’re in this together,’” but felt that, in practice, the tone 
was more dictatorial; some felt that in BTAs eyes, they were obstacles to get over rather than 
partners. One person put it this way: “BTA needs to be able to talk, to dialog, and they need to 
understand and adapt to [clients’] challenges, goals, and their willingness to change.”  Some 
respondents additionally felt that sometimes BTA led with technology as the catalyst for forcing 
changes, and not everyone agreed that this was the best approach for BTA personnel to take: “Using 
technology to make people talk is not the way to do it.” 
Criticism: Change should be driven by core business areas 
Along with the belief that BTA, as a whole, needs to be more collaborative, many 
respondents also felt that change needed to be driven from within the core business areas and not 
by BTA. One person articulated that the core problem with BTA driving change is that BTA doesn’t 
own the business process, and thus decisions become mired in power and control issues:  “BTA 
needs to be more efficient and have more robust enterprise architecture aligned with business 
objectives. The problem is that BTA doesn’t own business processes, so they get into bureaucracy 
struggle with who’s in charge.” Other respondents emphasized that BTA needed to work within the 
core business areas to drive change. One functional area owner stressed that “Business 
transformation works [in my organization] because we have authority over the main business 
mission. BTA is integrated into the requirements system so that the enterprise solution can be 
supported.” As this respondent points out, for BTA to effectively make business changes, they 
needed to work closely with the functional area experts to arrive at solutions together. However, 
some respondents said that even if the top level managers of BTA recognized the importance of 
changes being driven by core business owners, the agency as a whole did not: “David recognizes 
that [core business owners] are their clients, but not the whole organization … it has to be reflected 
in the mission—it can’t be personality driven.”  
Criticism: BTA is too technical and systems oriented 
The criticism that BTA is too systems-oriented is one among several tensions noted 
throughout the interviews (see “strategic vs. tactical” tension, above). On the one hand, respondents 
want strategic decisions made at higher levels (CMO/DCMO) and from the core business owners, 
with BTA acting primarily as the execution arm of that strategic direction. On the other hand, some 
respondents criticized BTA for being too technical and systems oriented. However, when 
respondents shared details about what they meant, the criticisms are clearer. Even if BTA is to act 
as an execution arm of a larger strategy set elsewhere, respondents wanted them to do so in ways 
that go beyond merely talking about systems. In some cases, the criticism was about how BTA 
shared information and discussed issues involved in transformative efforts. Several respondents 
noted that they had difficulty following BTA in meetings because they were “too technical,” dealt 
with “minute details” of systems, spoke in jargon-laden terms, operated too much in “the weeds,” 
and were “bureaucratically complex.” Another criticism was that cultural and organizational 
challenges involved in the changes were either not addressed by BTA or done so only “cavalierly.”  
Many respondents, as previously noted, believed that the cultural challenges involved in change 
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were at least as important as technical issues, and that BTA needed to play a bigger role in helping 
to manage those cultural and organizational challenges.  
Criticism: BTA is not good at selling  themselves 
An interesting critique of BTA was that they were not good at selling themselves and taking 
credit for the value they provide. In some ways, this is a critique wrapped around a strength, but 
nonetheless is important to consider. What respondents said was that the basic value proposition 
for BTA wasn’t clear, either from their web site or from the ETP. The ETP, in particular, was seen as 
having some value, but many saw it as trying to be all things to all people relative to what BTA was 
doing. Even those who better understood its purpose said they saw it as a plan rather than a 
demonstration of BTA’s value per se: “The ETP is about systems, [i.e.], when is BTA going to be 
ready with the enterprise systems … it’s just a plan.” In that sense, it wasn’t a good sales or public 
relations document because it was long, complex, and contained measures and metrics that some 
people said were difficult to understand, and two respondents claimed were inaccurate and based 
on faulty data. So, while the ETP may serve some purposes, it doesn’t appear to serve as a good 
illustration of BTA’s contributions. Part of demonstrating that value, according to some 
respondents, was that BTA needed to clearly convey why transformation was important for any 
given business process or system: “It’s about creating understanding … it’s important to show why 
transformation is important. If you show by example, then the institution will follow along.” 
Another respondent noted that BTA needed to do a better job of interpreting the metrics: “they’ve 
got to be able to speak numbers beyond arithmetic.” Not many respondents mentioned the BTA 
website, which is potentially interesting in itself. However, one respondent asserted that “The 
communication department and the BTA web site don’t explain their basic proposition and the 
enterprise Architecture … the larger BTA web site is outdated … it is a repository [for information], 
but not in sales way.” Finally, respondents also noted that BTA wasn’t always good at 
communicating the small wins, something that several noted as critical to do during long, arduous, 
change efforts.  
Criticism: The BEA is limited and overly technical 
The final critique is not about BTA specifically, but about the BEA. Some saw it as overly 
technical and difficult to navigate and use easily. “BTA is weighed down by enterprise architecture 
because people don’t know how to use it … the technical side of architecture weighs down the 
whole program.” However, the recent tool to improve accessibility was seen as favorable by a 
couple of respondents. Nonetheless, some saw the BEA as having moved up to such a high level that 
it wasn’t necessarily as useful as it once was to govern systems development and enforce 
standardization. Other respondents noted that the BEA tried to cover too much, achieve too many 
objectives, and serve too many business areas: “BTA should have started out with achievable 
objectives. Instead, they started with whole universe.  That’s why enterprise architecture is not 
useful.” While there was widespread agreement that a business architecture was necessary, some 
believed that the BEA should be more scalable, and some argued that each service should have its 
own BEA: “Given the size and complexity of DoD, the BEA is a drop in the bucket. Attempting to put 
it [the DoD-wide BEA] in the BTA doesn’t work, it’s too big. You need to empower the services to 
have their own BEA/ETP, and then hold them accountable to the outcomes.”83  Finally, some noted 
that the frequent version changes to the BEA were problematic and difficult to keep up with: 
“Compliance with different versions of the BEA is a problem.”   
                                                             
83 With the stand-up of military CMOs, this critique may be remedied. 
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Criticisms: Key recommendations 
Too large 
 Show how each BTA sub-unit provides unique and integrated value: BTA is seen as one large 
entity and its various missions may be misunderstood. To respond to the issue that BTA is 
too large, we recommend that BTA emphasize the unique value of each of its sub-units and 
how they integrate to provide value as an overall agency.  
 Be prepared to justify/evaluate your size: Given the presidential transition, it likely that BTA 
will be called upon to justify its footprint, regardless of who wins the election. We 
recommend that BTA combine the value assessment of sub-units, the assessment of 
contract vs. organic personnel, and the analysis of other components of the agency to 
prepare for justifying its size and scope of responsibilities.  
Not collaborative 
 Assess collaboration quality between BTA and its constituencies: The lack of collaboration 
was one of the clearest findings from our research. However, to assess the exact nature of 
the collaborative challenges between BTA and its constituencies, we recommend further 
research.    
 Assess value to constituencies to build trust and increase participation: In addition to, or in 
conjunction with, a collaboration assessment, we recommend further research to determine 
the value of BTA to its constituencies. Not only would this research add to BTA’s 
understanding of how it can best serve DoD, this research would also help to build trust and 
good faith between BTA and the enterprise.  
Lacks change management skills 
 Improve skill of BTA in consultative, interpersonal change management: BTA is not only in 
the business of technological and systems change, but also organizational and cultural 
change. As such, its personnel should be prepared to manage the interpersonal and 
management demands of a change environment. We recommend training and/or hiring 
new staff, and an increased attention to the interpersonal, consultative skills necessary to 
bring change to the enterprise.  
Not owner of business outcomes 
 Recognize the core businesses’ ownership of outcomes while negotiating from the strength of 
the enterprise view for implementation: Core business owners believe strongly that they 
need to retain ownership over business decisions and outcomes. BTA may better serve the 
enterprise in its role as a consultant to core business owners, one that provides valuable 
enterprise guidance and expertise. We recommend that BTA negotiate from its position of 
strength (enterprise knowledge) while simultaneously respecting core business owner 
control over business decisions.84  
Too systems focused 
 Tailor interactions to the audience’s needs by eliminating jargon and training personnel in 
professional communication: To be effective, BTA must be able to talk to various audiences, 
at various levels of technical specificity, about business transformation efforts. We 
recommend that BTA increase its focus on communicating more generally for some 
audiences. To do that, BTA should train its staff in professional communication that 
emphasizes audience sensitivity, speaking to general audiences, and communicating 
strategically for specific purposes.  
                                                             
84 It is important to note that BTA’s effectiveness here is somewhat dependent on a central entity setting 
policy mandates to which core business owners must be accountable.   
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Poor at selling themselves 
 Conduct strategic communication audit (audiences, goals, messages, styles, channels) and 
adjust your communication strategy: BTA may not be getting proper credit for the value it 
provides, a circumstance that is directly related to its communication practices, emphasis, 
and methods. We recommend that BTA conduct a complete communication audit, as part of 
developing a strategic communication plan, to more effectively communicate its value 
throughout the enterprise.   
BEA is ineffective 
 Continue to improve the accessibility to the BEA: Maintaining the BEA is an important part of 
the suite of services that BTA provides to DoD. However, it is a complicated system that 
some find difficult to navigate. We recommend that BTA continue to develop accessibility 
tools and processes that improve user interaction. 
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Table 2: Summary of Recommendations85 
Outcomes 
Listen for individual expected outcomes and connect BTA’s value to those outcomes 
Outcomes Recommendation DoD Ob Mc 
Efficiency  Emphasize efficiencies gained  9 9 9 
  Balance efficiency with effectiveness 9 9 9 
Effectiveness  Use multiple measures of effectiveness and be realistic  9 9 9 
  Tailor messages about effectiveness to specific audiences 9   
Transparency  Make data accessible, usable and standardized 9 9 9 
  Be prepared to share more data publicly  9 9 
Decision-making  Connect BTA activities to improved decision making 9   
Ease of Use  Research/design applications to meet user needs and processes 9   
Barriers 
Acknowledge and use existing barriers to develop common ground and build rapport 
Barriers Recommendation DoD Ob Mc 
Difficulty of change  Integrate the technical and social-cultural aspects of change 9   
 Be prepared for a shift to a more facilitative role as a change agent 9 9  
Unprepared 
Workforce 
 Provide DoD/BTA workforce development and training  9   
 Evaluate the balance of contract and organic staff 9 9 9 
Turf Protection  Come from a position of negotiating (not mandating) implementations 
 Focus on common goals first to build trust 










Leadership   Position BTA as a stabilizing agent of the new reform agenda  9 9 9 
Unrealistic 
expectations 
 Clarify, simplify, and communicate the mission of BTA 9 9 9 
 Tie quick, high value wins to long term goals 9 9 9 
Strengths
Use existing strengths to counter barriers and communicate the value of BTA 
Strengths Recommendation DoD Ob Mc 
Cross functional  Emphasize roles of mediator, impartial judge, and problem solver 9   
Expertise  Consult to DoD and share best practices and enterprise knowledge 9   
Standards  Continue to emphasize the management of standard frameworks 9   
Warfighting   Connect to the warfighting mission where appropriate 9 9 9 
Criticisms 
Address specific criticisms of BTA through organizational changes and/or improved communication strategies 
Criticisms Recommendation DoD Ob Mc 
Too large  Show how each BTA sub-unit provides unique and integrated value 9   
 Be prepared to justify/evaluate your size 9   
Not collaborative  Assess collaboration quality between BTA and its constituencies 




Lacks CM skills  Improve skill of BTA in consultative, interpersonal change management  9   
Not owner of 
business outcomes 
 Recognize the core businesses’ ownership of outcomes while negotiating from 
the strength of the enterprise view for implementation 
9   
Too systems focused  Tailor interactions to the audience’s needs 




Poor at selling 
themselves 
 Conduct strategic communication audit (audiences, goals, messages, styles, 
channels) and adjust your communication strategy 
9   
BEA is ineffective  Continue to improve the accessibility to the BEA 9   
                                                             
85 The checks in the “DoD,” “Ob” (Obama), and “Mc” (McCain) boxes indicate their alignment  with the recommendation 
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Appendix A: Candidate Sketches  
 
 
       Obama   
Senator Obama is a consensus builder, one who listens to multiple points of view 
and considers objective evidence prior to making decisions. He considers himself 
pragmatic, but he has also been portrayed as idealistic. We can reconcile both 
statements by suggesting that ideals create the vision and the desired objective; 
but specific action steps are necessarily limited in their effectiveness because of 
the complexity of the issues and infrastructure within which implementation 
takes place. We believe his defense business reform trajectory will emphasize an overhaul to 
acquisition and contracting processes to include re-evaluating the mix of items in the acquisition 
portfolio. In his view, there are some mission areas and capabilities that are overemphasized and 
others that are underemphasized.  Like McCain, he will strive to conduct the government’s business 
in an ethical and transparent fashion. He takes a holistic rather than fragmented view and will look 
across traditional boundaries to create capabilities. This view may mean a migration of missions 
and capabilities between uniformed and civilian agencies. Obama also sees the civil service as a 
valuable tool for reform, but one that is limited in certain skill sets. He seeks to expand the 
capability of the government workforce to deal with evolving mission areas rather than outsource 
to contractors. 
 
       McCain 
Senator McCain is a more directive leader and less of a consensus builder. He has a 
clear vision of how he expects government to operate and may be less willing to 
accept alternative views. He has an action orientation rather than a deliberation 
orientation. Because of that, one should expect reforms to be designed and 
implemented more quickly and directly than in an Obama administration. He is 
also planning to overhaul acquisition and contracting; his goal is to ensure DoD 
effectively buys systems. He is intolerant of parochial interests interfering with broader national 
security interests, and he intends to address them. Like Obama, he will seek to do so in an ethical 
and transparent fashion. He intends to employ best business practices from the for-profit sector 
and believes the incentives that exist in industry should be imported to government for increased 
efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, he will seek further reforms of the civil service with the goal of 
making them more performance-oriented and accountable. Where skills are lacking in the civil 
service, he will be more prone to buy them from the private sector than to develop an organic 
capability. He will seek to ensure readiness in traditional defense mission areas, and he will be less 
prone to dramatically shift the acquisition or capability portfolios.  
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Appendix B: Political Candidate Advisers 
 
One can infer policy positions and leadership styles of potential presidents by examining 
those who serve as advisers during the campaign. The following have advised and have helped 
shape the national security strategies of the two candidates during the campaign:86 
Advisors to Barack Obama 
 
Jeffrey Bader, Former Ambassador, President Clinton’s National Security Council Asia specialist and 
now head of Brookings’s China center 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s national security adviser and now a Center for Strategic and 
International Studies counselor and trustee 
Gregory B. Craig, State Department director of policy planning under President Clinton and now a 
partner at law firm Williams & Connolly 
Roger W. Cressey, former National Security Council counterterrorism staffer and now Good Harbor 
Consulting president 
Richard Danzig, President Clinton’s Navy secretary and now a Center for Strategic and International 
Analysis fellow 
Maj. Gen. J. (Jonathan) Scott Gration, a 32-year Air Force veteran and now CEO of Africa anti-
poverty effort Millennium Villages 
Richard Holbrooke, former US ambassador to the UN; former asst sec state under Carter and 
Clinton. 
Lawrence J. Korb, assistant secretary of defense from 1981-1985 and now a senior fellow at the 
Center for American Progress 
W. Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s national security adviser and now a professor at 
Georgetown’s school of foreign service 
Robert Malley, President Clinton’s Middle East envoy and now International Crisis Group’s Middle 
East and North Africa program director 
Gen. Merrill A. ("Tony") McPeak, former Air Force chief of staff and now a business consultant 
Denis McDonough, Center for American Progress senior fellow and former policy adviser to then-
Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle 
                                                             
86 This list was compiled from numerous news accounts, but primarily from “The War of the Wonks,” The 
Washington Post, October 2, 2007, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/opinions/documents/the-war-over-the-wonks.html (July 28, 2008) 
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Samantha Power, Harvard-based human rights scholar and Pulitzer Prize winning writer 
Susan E. Rice, President Clinton’s Africa specialist at the State Department and National Security 
Council and now a Brookings senior fellow 
Dennis B. Ross, President Clinton’s Middle East negotiator and now a Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy fellow 
Sarah Sewall, deputy assistant secretary of defense for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance 
during President Clinton’s administration and now director of Harvard’s Carr Center for Human 
Rights Policy 
Daniel B. Shapiro, National Security Council director for legislative affairs during President Clinton’s 
administration and now a lobbyist with Timmons & Company 
Advisors to John McCain 
Richard Lee Armitage, President George W. Bush’s deputy secretary of state and an international 
business consultant and lobbyist 
Bernard Aronson, former assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs and now a managing 
partner of private equity investment company ACON Investments 
William L. Ball III, secretary of the Navy during President Reagan’s administration and managing 
director of lobbying firm the Loeffler Group 
Max Boot, Council on Foreign Relations editor and former Wall Street Journal editorial editor 
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, President George H.W. Bush’s secretary of state and a senior public policy 
adviser with law firm Baker Donelson 
Niall Ferguson, Harvard historian and Hoover Institution senior fellow 
Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., President Reagan’s secretary of state 
Robert Kagan; senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington 
Post columnist and former speechwriter for then-secretary of state George P. Shultz 
Brig. Gen. Robert Michael Kimmitt, current deputy Treasury secretary 
Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon and President Ford’s secretary of state and is now a consultant 
Adm. Charles Larson, former superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy and now chairman of 
consulting firm ViaGlobal Group 
John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy under Reagan for 6 years, member of the 9/11 commission, on 
national security council under Kissinger. 
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Robert "Bud" McFarlane, President Reagan’s national security adviser and now a principal with 
Energy & Communications Solutions 
Gen. Colin L. Powell, former joint chiefs chairman, President George W. Bush’s secretary of state 
James R. Schlesinger, President Nixon and President Ford’s secretary of defense 
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to Presidents Ford and George H.W. Bush and 
founder of business consultancy the Scowcroft Group 
George P. Shultz, President Reagan’s secretary of state and a Hoover Institution Fellow 
R. James Woolsey, former CIA director and now a vice president at consulting company Booz Allen 
Hamilton 
Several retired Army generals from the Iowa Veterans Advisory Committee 
 
